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Hear about the cutting edge of development economics from research to practice. 
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  • S7 · E43
    Wednesday · 35 min

    S7 Ep43: Caste, race, and power: The barriers to political inclusion

    The ballot cast by a landless labourer counts the same as the one cast by the landlord whose fields he works. In this way, democracy can give excluded or subordinate groups access to political power. That's not what has happened, at least, not in large parts of the Global South. Amit Ahuja (UC Santa Barbara) calls those at the bottom of the social order "subaltern groups". Three barriers stand between their votes and any lasting gain. Violence that goes unpunished. The erasure of their shared culture and history by those in power. And they have too little money and organisation to campaign for their rights. The evidence shows that since 2014 the gains that these groups made in the previous three decades have started to reverse, he warns. The old hierarchies are reasserting themselves. The research behind this episode: Ahuja, Amit. 2026. "Subaltern Mobilization in the Global South." Annual Review of Political Science 29: 391-411. Open access. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Amit Ahuja. 2026. "Caste, race, and power: The barriers to political inclusion." VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guest Amit Ahuja is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, with research spanning ethnic parties and movements, military organisation, caste, and the politics of inclusion and exclusion in multiethnic societies. His book Mobilizing the Marginalized: Ethnic Parties Without Ethnic Movements won the 2020 Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay NIF Book Prize. He co-edited Internal Security in India: Violence, Order, and the State with Devesh Kapur. Research cited in this episode Subaltern. The word means "of inferior rank" and was used by Antonio Gramsci in the Prison Notebooks to describe groups subordinated by a ruling elite. Ahuja gives it three working attributes: a stigmatised identity acquired at birth, disproportionate poverty, and disadvantage that passes from one generation to the next. Ranked and unranked social orders. Donald Horowitz, in Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985; University of California Press, 2000 edition), separates societies where groups sit in a vertical hierarchy from those where they sit side by side. The Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba in Nigeria, and Maronite Christians, Sunnis and Shia in Lebanon, compete without one being formally subordinate to another. Hierarchy is not a universal feature of diverse societies. Greed against grievance. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler argued in 2004 that people join insurgencies to capture resources such as diamonds or minerals; Ted Gurr's Why Men Rebel (1970) argued instead that rebellion follows the gap between what people have and what they expect. Ahuja adds a third answer drawn from ethnography. The dignity of insurgency. Elisabeth Wood's study of El Salvador (2003) and Alpa Shah's work on Maoist central India (2013) both find that the poor support armed movements partly because insurgents treat them better than landlords and state officials do. Participation confers dignity in a setting built to deny it. The identity penalty. Devorah Manekin and Tamar Mitts (2022) find that nonviolent campaigns led by marginalised groups attract less popular participation and fewer elite defections than comparable campaigns led by dominant groups. Nonviolence works, but not equally well for everyone. Undocumented rights. Afro-descendant communities on Colombia's Pacific coast, the San in the Central Kalahari, and Adivasis in India's forests all hold customary claims that colonial and postcolonial registries never recorded. Without a written record they are reclassified; Adivasis became "encroachers" under British forest law and the conservation regimes that followed. The Dalit Panthers. Formed in western India in the 1970s, the group combined revolutionary politics with armed self-protection for Dalits facing caste violence, taking its name and some of its style from the Black Panther Party. Military service as a school for organisers. Black South Africans recruited during the Second World War, and Dalits taken into the British Indian Army during the world wars, both emerged with leadership training and a more assertive political style. Dominant groups are usually reluctant to arm subaltern populations; labour shortages force the question. The Indian Election Commission. Amit Ahuja and Susan Ostermann (2018) trace how the commission secured polling stations through the 1990s and 2000s, which made it possible for parties to bring marginalised voters to the poll. Institutional autonomy, backed by the courts, can partly offset a coercive environment. Co-optation in Bolivia. Movimiento al Socialismo absorbed parts of the country's Indigenous movement and blunted its radical edge. Alignment with a party brings resources and patronage positions; it can also cost a movement its original demands. More VoxDev Talks episodes Can contact between groups reduce prejudice? Matt Lowe on why decades of evidence for the contact hypothesis look weaker under preregistration, and why prejudice does not simply fade with development. Caste, identity, and worker productivity in India Daniel Keniston on how caste still sorts Indians into occupations, and what the economy loses because of it. Related reading on VoxDev.org Something to complain about: How minority representatives overcome ethnic barriers, on a formal complaints system in Bihar that gave Scheduled Caste ward members leverage over village heads who were holding up their projects. How expanding voting rights shaped politics in India. Franchise expansion in 1935 and 1950 barely moved turnout or competition, and yet it shifted public spending towards the newly enfranchised. No representation without reservation: The long-term limits of gender quotas in India, on what happens to descriptive representation once the quota is withdrawn.

  • S7 · E42
    August 19 · 26 min

    S7 Ep42: Masculinity norms and their economic implications

    Do economists treat what men do as normal human behaviour, and then study norms around women as a departure? If so, we need to pay more attention what we mean by masculinity. That's what Pauline Grosjean (University of New South Wales, CEPR) does. She argues that these masculinity norms carry economic weight of their own. What do men around the world think "being a man" means? The consistent answers: winning against other men, self-reliance, control over women, aggression, and the avoidance of anything coded as weak or homosexual. Grosjean and her co-authors measure adherence to these core dimensions across 70 countries. How do these beliefs vary by age, economic development, and culture? And what do they predict about the way men will behave? The research behind this episode: Matavelli, Ieda, Pauline Grosjean, Ralph De Haas, and Victoria Baranov. 2026. "Masculinity Norms and Their Economic Implications." Annual Review of Economics 18:127-55. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Pauline Grosjean. 2026. "Masculinity norms and their economic implications." VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guest Pauline Grosjean is a professor in the School of Economics at the University of New South Wales and a fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Her research spans culture and institutions, gender roles, violence and conflict, and how historical conditions shape economic behaviour long after those conditions have gone. Research and concepts cited in this episode Masculinity norms. Social expectations about how men should behave, or how a "real man" should behave. Grosjean draws the distinction from gender-role norms, which define men relative to women. Masculinity norms are largely about how men rank against other men. The five core dimensions measured in the survey are the importance of winning and status, self-reliance and help avoidance, violence, power over women, and avoidance of homosexuality. Global Masculinity Survey. The 70-country survey behind the review, built on measurement tools developed by social psychologists and run in partnership with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development across its countries of operation, then extended to a further 32 countries. See De Haas, Ralph, Victoria Baranov, Ieda Matavelli, and Pauline Grosjean. 2024. "Masculinity Around the World." CEPR Discussion Paper 19493 (gated). Male-biased sex ratios in colonial Australia. Grosjean's earlier work uses convict transportation, which left parts of Australia with far more men than women, as a natural experiment. Areas that were historically male-biased show stronger masculinity norms today, more violence and male suicide, and weaker support for same-sex marriage; the last of these puzzled economists, because a shortage of women should, on a supply-and-demand reading, make men more relaxed about other men's homosexuality, not less. See Baranov, Victoria, Ralph De Haas, and Pauline Grosjean. 2023. "Men. Male-Biased Sex Ratios and Masculinity Norms: Evidence from Australia's Colonial Past." Journal of Economic Growth 28:339-96. Ten to Men. An Australian longitudinal study of male health that measures both adherence to masculinity norms and a range of self-reported violent behaviour. Grosjean cites its strong associations between norm adherence and interpersonal aggression, sexual violence and self-directed harm. Testosterone and status seeking. The link often assumed to run from testosterone to aggression is, on the evidence, better read as a link to status seeking, with aggression only one of its possible expressions. Testosterone itself responds to social context, diet and caregiving, so it sits inside the culture rather than outside it. Misperceived norms. Men often overestimate how strongly other men endorse restrictive norms, and also misjudge what women want, believing women approve of controlling or emotionally closed behaviour when they do not. Grosjean links this to Marianne Bertrand's work on men declining paternity leave for fear of others' disapproval, and to the gender-segregated online spaces of the manosphere, where the norms are advertised and reinforced. School intervention in Brazil. An ongoing trial with Ieda Matavelli comparing two approaches in schools, one closer to cognitive behavioural therapy and one that directly tackles beliefs about what it means to be a man. Matavelli's earlier work documents how warped young men's views of others' expectations can be, and tests whether correcting them changes behaviour. More VoxDev Talks episodes Non-elite women in politics. Soledad Artiz Prillaman on how patriarchal norms and social networks shape which women can take part in politics, and why a seat count tells you little about power. Paid work for women and domestic violence. Deniz Sanin on how the spread of coffee mills in Rwanda gave women paid work and, with it, less violence at home. Related reading Masculinity norms and their economic consequences, a VoxEU column by the four authors setting out how these norms shape labour markets, health, education, households and politics, with the country and individual-level survey findings.

  • S7 · E41
    August 14 · 1 hr 3 min

    S7 Ep41: How global supply chains are built

    This is an episode from VoxDev's new podcast series, Ideas in Development. This series has a separate podcast feed, where you can find every episode of Oliver Hanney’s conversations with leading development thinkers. YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jgwcv4fyU28 Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/how-global-supply-chains-are-built-and-how-to/id1866874059?i=1000774798943 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/5EECcLVxxEQtkX3gJZcHGH?si=94e15ed7834a4e86 Audioboom: https://audioboom.com/posts/8922412-how-global-supply-chains-are-built-and-how-to-actually-attract-investment Substack: https://ideasindevelopment.substack.com/p/how-global-supply-chains-are-built Bill McRaith spent his career building supply chains – from 1980s Britain, to a factory in Panyu, China in 1990, to Ethiopia three decades later. He joins Oliver Hanney to explain what really attracts manufacturing investment to a developing economy, and why the model most countries are targeting no longer exists. In this wide-ranging conversation we cover why China’s industry grew; why responsive local governments beat tax holidays; the collapse of the wage gap; how Ethiopia was chosen as a beachhead; and why apparel remains the right first-mover industry for countries not yet on the industrialisation road.

  • S7 · E40
    August 12 · 26 min

    S7 Ep40: Using mobile phones to support teachers, parents, and students

    More households in low-income countries own a mobile phone than have electricity or clean water. So why is education one of the last places it has been put to work? Jenny Aker (Cornell) and Noam Angrist (Oxford) are the academic leads on a J-PAL Policy Insight that reviews 30 studies of mobile phone programmes in education. They tell Tim Phillips that the cheapest option, blasting out SMS messages, is usually the one that fails. But put a real person on the other end of the line, and that's an effective and inexpensive way to improve education. The phone is a platform, Angrist points out, not a pedagogy. The research behind this episode: Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL). 2026. "Leveraging Mobile Phones for Learning." J-PAL Policy Insight. Academic leads Jenny Aker and Noam Angrist; insight authors Jessica Williams and Demitria Wack. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, Jenny Aker, and Noam Angrist. 2026. "Using mobile phones to support teachers, parents, and students." VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guests Jenny Aker is the Daniel G. Sisler Professor of Development Economics at Cornell University. She is also a non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development and co-chair of the Digital Identification and Finance Initiative at J-PAL Africa. Her research spans mobile technology and agricultural markets, adult literacy and numeracy, financial inclusion, and the design of cash transfers and social protection in Africa. Noam Angrist is Academic Director of the What Works Hub for Global Education and Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford, and co-founder of Youth Impact, one of the largest NGOs scaling health and education programmes backed by randomised trial evidence. His research spans distance education, the measurement of implementation, and how programmes that work in a trial can be made to work at national scale. Research and concepts cited in this episode One Laptop per Child. The plan to put a cheap laptop in the hands of every child in the developing world, launched in 2005 and abandoned as evidence of its effect on learning failed to appear. Angrist raises it as the cautionary tale for anyone introducing a device: the schools could not absorb it, the software was an afterthought, and nobody planned for charging or breakage. Phones avoid that problem because they are already there, so the marginal cost of adding good pedagogy is low. A long-term follow up from rural Peru found no positive effect on educational outcomes. Mobile coverage. GSMA. 2025. "The State of Mobile Internet Connectivity 2025." Around 95% of the world's population now lives within range of a broadband network. In sub-Saharan Africa coverage is about 80% and adoption about 60%, and what people mostly hold is a simple handset rather than a smartphone. Phone tutoring in emergencies. Angrist, Noam, Micheal Ainomugisha, Sai Pramod Bathena, Peter Bergman, Colin Crossley, Claire Cullen, Thato Letsomo, Moitshepi Matsheng, Rene Marlon Panti, Shwetlena Sabarwal, and Tim Sullivan. 2023. "Building Resilient Education Systems: Evidence from Large-Scale Randomized Trials in Five Countries." NBER Working Paper 31208, revised 2025. Weekly maths texts combined with live tutoring calls raised test scores by 0.30 to 0.35 standard deviations at an average cost of US$11 per child. SMS on its own moved the needle only where access to learning was already very low. Scaling up without the drop. The first Botswana phone tutoring trial produced an effect of about 0.12 standard deviations; by the fifth replication, in Uganda, Angrist says the effect was over 0.8, and implementation fidelity data improved in step with the order of the studies. He sets this against the voltage drop described by John List in The Voltage Effect (2022), the tendency of programmes to lose their punch as they scale. Common, Angrist argues, but not inevitable. A/B testing the tutoring call. Angrist, Noam, Claire Cullen, and Janica Magat. 2025. "Cheaper (and More Effective) by the Dozen: Evidence from 12 Randomised A/B Tests Optimising Tutoring for Scale." What Works Hub for Global Education Working Paper 2025/001. Roughly half the cost of a tutoring programme goes on scheduling rather than teaching. One call of 40 minutes every fortnight, instead of 20 minutes every week, delivered the same dosage for less. Handing the call to a parent partway through doubled to tripled the effect; motivational nudges to parents did nothing. Monitoring teachers by phone. Aker, Jenny C., and Christopher Ksoll. 2019. "Call Me Educated: Evidence from a Mobile Phone Experiment in Niger." Economics of Education Review 72: 239 to 257. Weekly calls to the teacher, the village chief and two students raised maths and reading scores. The counter-example comes from Côte d'Ivoire, where nudging parents and teachers at the same time left the most motivated teachers turning up less; too much scrutiny, the authors suggest, corroded the motivation the programme depended on. Platform and pedagogy. Angrist's phrase for the distinction the review keeps returning to. The phone carries an intervention; it is not the intervention. Targeted instruction and early childhood stimulation both travel down the line, but somebody still has to decide how often to call, who picks up, and what happens on the call. The same traffic makes the phone a good instrument for research, since the data is traceable and the units of randomisation are well powered. Education Cannot Wait. The United Nations fund for education in emergencies and protracted crises. Its 2022 global estimate put 222 million crisis-affected children and adolescents in need of urgent education support, up from about 75 million in 2016. Angrist uses the same figure in the five-country paper, and cites it here to make the point that the humanitarian structures for education in emergencies exist while the evidence base underneath them barely does. More VoxDev Talks episodes How AI can put 20 years of development evidence to work. Iqbal Dhaliwal on why One Laptop per Child failed, and what that failure should teach anyone now betting on AI in development. Why we need to invest in foundational learning. Benjamin Piper on the gap between getting children into school and getting them to read, which is the gap most of these phone programmes are trying to close. Related reading on VoxDev.org How simple technologies can improve learning: Evidence from Niger, in which Jenny Aker and Christopher Ksoll show that a weekly call to teachers and students almost doubled the effect of an adult education programme. Educating children in emergencies: Global evidence from five randomised trials, the five-country evidence on cheap phone tutoring that runs through much of this conversation. How AI tutors improved learning in Nigeria, on a six-week after-school programme in Edo State that produced large gains in English, and on the guardrails that made it work.

  • S7 · E39
    August 6 · 50 min

    S7 Ep39: Ideas in Development: Moving billions to evidence

    This is an episode from VoxDev's new podcast series, Ideas in Development. This series has a separate podcast feed, where you can find every episode of Oliver Hanney’s conversations on evidence. YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-e0GAFGaJ0 Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/moving-billions-towards-evidence/id1866874059?i=1000772910756 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/12UqCmkB4oLLWqoHpT5Lyt?si=6be55d2c81884d65 Audioboom: https://audioboom.com/posts/8917092-moving-billions-towards-evidence Substack: https://ideasindevelopment.substack.com/p/moving-billions-towards-evidence In 2022, Dean Karlan became Chief Economist at USAID, tasked with steering the world's largest bilateral aid agency towards evidence-backed approaches. He left in 2025, as the agency was being dismantled, having moved roughly $1.7 billion of funding in the process. In this episode of Ideas in Development, Dean joins Oliver Hanney to discuss what evidence-based policy actually looks like inside a government institution; how his team picked their battles; why collaboration beat prescription; and where the limits of taking goals as given lie. They also cover the rise of embedded evidence labs in countries like Rwanda and Peru, the synthesis and implementation gaps between academia and policy, and whether there are questions in development economics, like the impacts of cash transfers, on which we now have enough evidence. Dean Karlan is Professor of Economics and Finance at Northwestern University, founder of Innovations for Poverty Action, and former Chief Economist of USAID.

  • S7 · E38
    July 29 · 30 min

    S7 Ep38: How AI can put 20 years of development evidence to work

    A farmer in rural Ghana can use her phone to take a picture of a blighted leaf, upload it, and within seconds she gets a diagnosis that takes account of the soil, the weather, and the other local conditions. Score one for AI. We don't have enough human experts because they are hard to train, and harder still to retain, so apps like this have huge potential. But it doesn't mean they will succeed. Iqbal Dhaliwal, global executive director at J-PAL, has watched ambitious tech dreams for development fall apart before. Remember one laptop per child, the plan that failed because schools didn't have technical support, the right lesson plans -- or even electricity? He tells Tim Phillips that AI can succeed, as long as whoever is using it has thought through the theory of change, designs for impact rather than downloads, and can scale up successful experiments. J-PAL has launched the AI Evidence Playbook to help policymakers solve these knotty problems. The research behind this episode Dhaliwal, Iqbal, Sam Carter, Attaullah Abbasi, and Audrey Lorvo. 2026. AI Evidence Playbook: A Practical Guide. Cambridge, MA: Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL). To cite this episode Phillips, Tim, and Iqbal Dhaliwal. 2026. "How AI can put 20 years of development evidence to work." VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guest Iqbal Dhaliwal is global executive director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), based at MIT, and co-chairs Project AI Evidence. He co-directs J-PAL's South Asia office with Esther Duflo. Before joining J-PAL in 2009 he served in the Indian Administrative Service, where he ran a statewide welfare department and led a public company, delivering large-scale programmes in the field. His work spans the design, evaluation, and scale-up of anti-poverty programmes, and the question of when a technology genuinely changes lives rather than dashboards. Research and concepts cited in this episode Project AI Evidence (PAIE) is J-PAL's initiative to identify, evaluate, and scale applications of AI for social good, and to scale down those that may cause harm. The AI Evidence Playbook is its practical output, a reference for policymakers, practitioners, and donors weighing whether and how to adopt AI-enabled programmes. The six pathways. The playbook groups two decades of development evidence into six areas where AI could raise impact or cut cost: improving needs prediction and targeting; increasing access to personalised, timely support; maximising the effectiveness of frontline service providers; improving organisational and programmatic efficiency; reducing bias and ensuring fairness; and boosting government resource mobilisation, including more progressive taxation. Machine learning targeting in Togo. During the Covid-19 pandemic, Togo's government wanted to reach its poorest households but lacked the administrative data to find them. Researchers used satellite imagery to identify likely-poor neighbourhoods from features such as house size and roof quality, then paired it with mobile phone records to narrow down poorer individuals within them; a practical, rapid way to fill a data gap without a social registry. Theory of change. The sequence of steps connecting an input to a final outcome. Dhaliwal's point is that most people hold an optimistic hypothesis rather than a theory of change: the inputs and the hoped-for outcome are clear, but the intermediary links, adoption, trust, workflows, repair, are missing. Writing it on paper is where the gaps show. Design for impact, design for scale. Engagement numbers and downloads are a first step, not proof of impact. Designing for scale means designing for a farmer who may lack a device, may lack reliable connectivity, and may not trust the technology without the extension worker they have known for fifteen years. One laptop per child, and smokeless stoves. Dhaliwal raises both as technologies whose theory of change was sound but whose delivery was not thought through: the school system could not absorb the laptop, the electricity and connectivity were not there, and no one planned for breakage. The relevant cautionary parallel for AI, whose problems he argues are not just inherited but exacerbated by the pace of change. Global knowledge, local context. Dhaliwal separates rules that can be changed from genuine context differences. A programme that works in India but "won't work in Ghana" because teachers there work six hours rather than six hours fifteen minutes is a rule problem, and solvable. A classroom of 1:20 versus 1:60 is a real contextual difference worth worrying about. More VoxDev Talks episodes The development economics of AI: Lessons and questions. Oliver Hanney and Deena Mousa take stock of what an entire series of conversations revealed about where AI helps in development, and where the evidence runs thin. Related reading on VoxDev.org AI and development economics: Early evidence and how to keep up, a running VoxDev reading list on the impacts of AI in low- and middle-income countries that includes J-PAL's AI Evidence Playbook among its resources.

  • S7 · E37
    July 22 · 33 min

    S7 Ep37: Why businesses stay small in emerging markets

    If you walk down a street in a low-income country, count the businesses you can see, you will miss many entirely. Someone who cooks at home and sells at the roadside never appears in a registry. What we know about businesses in developing countries has always been incomplete. In this week's VoxDev Talk, Marcela Eslava (Universidad de los Andes Bogota) talks to Tim Phillips about two decades of research into why firms in developing economies stay small, grow slowly, and rarely break through. A worker in a developing economy is about three times more likely to be running, or working in, one of these very small businesses than a worker in a high income economy, and far more likely to be self-employed, a one-person firm. Weaker human capital and less access to technology make it harder to start a business. Costlier credit, labour regulation that makes it difficult and expensive to employ staff, and taxes on formal firms make it harder to grow. Some of these distortions are even introduced by well-meaning policymakers, such as low taxes for small firms - which then effectively tax growth. The research behind this episode: Eslava, Marcela. 2026. "Firm Size and Dynamics in Less-Developed Economies." Annual Review of Economics, volume 18. Review in advance; changes may still occur before final publication. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Marcela Eslava. 2026. "Why businesses stay small in emerging markets." VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guest Marcela Eslava is Professor of Economics and Dean of the Faculty of Economics at Universidad de los Andes in Bogota¡, and President of the Latin American and the Caribbean Economic Association. Her research spans firm dynamics, productivity and demand at the firm level, labour informality, credit constraints, and the regulations that shape how businesses grow in developing economies. Research cited in this episode The Lucas-Hopenhayn framework. The workhorse model of firm dynamics, built on Robert Lucas's 1978 account of occupational choice and Hugo Hopenhayn's 1992 model of entry and exit; it links the size of the average firm to the productivity of potential entrepreneurs and to distortions that stop the most efficient firms from scaling. Eslava's review extends it to explain why firms are smaller in poorer economies. Nonemployers and micro employers. Own-account and self-employed workers plus the smallest employers; in Eslava and co-authors' sample of 51 economies they account for over 90% of employment in lower-middle-income economies and around 20% in the United States. Their dominance is the main reason average firm size is so low in poorer countries. Correlated distortions. Taxes, regulations and credit frictions that fall more heavily on high-productivity firms; because they hold back the firms that should be growing, they push labour towards less productive businesses and drag down aggregate output. They show up in the models as residuals, the part of the size gap that productivity and quality cannot explain. Size-dependent policies. Rules that switch on above an employment threshold, such as the extra workplace obligations that apply to firms above 50 employees in France, or above 20 in Peru; Eslava describes comparing firms just above and just below a threshold as one way to prise open the black box of distortions and measure what a specific rule does. Demand versus cost efficiency. Work on Colombian manufacturing decomposing a firm's success into technical efficiency and the appeal of its products; the demand side contributes many times more to differences in revenue than cost efficiency does. Eslava's point is that trimming costs buys survival, while product quality and market access drive real growth. The data-coverage puzzle. Early firm-level studies found average firm size falling as countries got richer, the reverse of what later work established; the anomaly came from datasets that captured only the large, registered firms in poor economies and missed the vast base of tiny ones. Better censuses, and household and employment surveys that count people rather than firms, corrected the picture. More VoxDev Talks episodes What have we learned about the informal sector? Gabriel Ulyssea and Mariaflavia Harari on the causes and consequences of informality, the close cousin of micro-enterprise that runs through this conversation. Related reading on VoxDev Can variation in firm growth explain the development gap? Colombia vs the US, by Marcela Eslava, John Haltiwanger and Alvaro Pinzón, on how a deficit of superstar plants and an excess of surviving underperformers shape Colombia's development problem. The links between capabilities and export dynamics in developing countries, on how firm capabilities, product quality and market knowledge shape which firms manage to export.

  • S7 · E36
    July 15 · 30 min

    S7 Ep36: Climate Change Politics in Developing Countries

    A river dries up. The soil turns salty. A harvest fails. Farmers across the developing world feel climate change constantly and personally, they rarely blame their government, or demand action. Guy Grossman (University of Pennsylvania) is one of three authors of a new review of the politics of climate change in the developing world. He tells Tim Phillips that almost all of the existing research on this topic is focused on rich countries, even though the developing world faces the worst of the damage, and has the least capacity to absorb it, because in those countries the link between climate change and political action is more explicit. Political solutions are needed: developing country income losses could run 60% higher than losses in wealthy countries, and climate change could push between 32 and 132 million people into extreme poverty within a decade. Grossman's review turns up a paradox in the public opinion data. Concern runs high even where formal climate literacy is low, because people experience the crisis through a failed harvest or a dried up well, not a scientific chart. This disconnect isn't neutral, because vulnerability isn't simply inherited. It is produced, by decisions about who owns land, whose villages get seawalls, and whose voice counts when climate money is handed out. The research behind this episode: Grossman, Guy, Audrey Sacks, and Alice Xu. 2026. "The Politics of Climate Change in the Developing World." Annual Review of Political Science 29: 101-126. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Guy Grossman. 2026. "Climate Change Politics in Developing Countries." VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guest Guy Grossman is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. He founded and co-directs Penn's Development Research Initiative (PDRI-DevLab), and his research spans governance, forced displacement, political accountability, and conflict processes across the developing world, with a particular regional focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. Research cited in this episode Extreme poverty projections. World Bank economists Bramka Arga Jafino, Stephane Hallegatte, Julie Rozenberg, and Brian Walsh estimate that climate change could push between 32 and 132 million people into extreme poverty by 2030; the wide range reflects uncertainty over which emissions and development pathway the world follows. Read the working paper. Afrobarometer. A long running, pan African survey network covering more than 30 countries. Grossman's review draws on it to show that only around four in ten respondents identify human activity as the main cause of climate change, even as concern about its effects runs far higher. The attitudinal and accountability channels. Two frameworks political scientists use to trace how climate exposure might change political behaviour. The attitudinal channel asks whether living through a flood or a drought changes what someone believes about climate change; the accountability channel asks whether it changes their vote. Grossman finds evidence for both, but little that explains when concern turns into political pressure. Maladaptation. The academic term for private adaptation that shifts harm onto someone else, such as a village embankment that protects one community by pushing floodwater into the next. Grossman uses it to illustrate why adaptation without government coordination can widen inequality rather than close it. Ecuador land titling. Mark Buntaine, Stuart Hamilton, and Marco Millones's 2015 study of a titling programme in Morona Santiago found it did almost nothing to slow deforestation, because the state never backed the new titles with enforcement. Grossman cites it as evidence that representation without power tends to fail. Indigenous managed land. Research led by Stephen Garnett finds that Indigenous peoples, roughly 6.2% of the world's population, manage more than a quarter of the planet's land surface, often protecting carbon sinks more effectively than formally designated protected areas. More VoxDev Talks episodes Financing climate adaptation: what works, what doesn't, and can carbon credits help to bridge the gap? Namrata Kala, Rohini Pande, and Catherine Wolfram pick up where Grossman leaves off, on who pays for adaptation when governments won't. How the urban environment can adapt to climate change. Matthew Kahn and Siqi Zheng discuss how cities in the developing world can adapt their buildings and infrastructure as climate driven migration accelerates. Related reading on VoxDev.org Climate politics: understanding political inaction on climate change. Allan Hsiao and Nicholas Kuipers show that Indonesian politicians underestimate voter concern about climate and pollution, and that correcting their misperceptions does not, on its own, produce policy action; a real world case of the accountability channel breaking down. Political representation and forest conservation? This finds that transferring formal political power, not just consultation, to India's historically marginalised Scheduled Tribes led to a measurable fall in deforestation.

  • S7 · E35
    July 10 · 52 min

    S7 Ep35: Ideas in Development: Has development economics lost its way?

    This is an episode from VoxDev's new podcast series, Ideas in Development. This series has a separate podcast feed, where you can find every episode of Oliver Hanney’s conversations on evidence. YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EacHFVRt9p4 Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/has-development-economics-lost-its-way/id1866874059?i=1000775748550 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/2Lcy3FrbBuoE2nj3cnhOAm?si=76aedb574426479e Audioboom: https://audioboom.com/posts/8924691-has-development-economics-lost-its-way Substack: https://ideasindevelopment.substack.com/p/has-development-economics-lost-its What should development economists be working on – and how does their work actually reach the people making decisions? Rachel Glennerster, President of the Center for Global Development, whose career spans the research and policy sides of development, joins Oliver Hanney to discuss her proposal for a radical simplification of aid, why she feels the micro-macro debate is largely a false one, the messy but vital process of building consensus, and what impactful careers look like in economics. In this wide-ranging conversation, we cover the Smart Buys evidence panels in education and how cross-disciplinary consensus gets built, her three-box framework for evidence-based policymaking, why AI tools move too fast for RCT-based procurement, and what it would take to fix development economics' concentration problem.

  • S7 · E34
    July 8 · 23 min

    S7 Ep34: Why farmers struggle to adopt new agricultural technology

    How many maize seeds should farmers plant in each hole? Ask the farmers and they say two or three. Agronomists can show them more reliable seeds, where they only need one. But change the seed and everything else changes too; the fertiliser, the spacing, the whole system. This is why getting better technology into the hands of African farmers, and helping them to find ways to improve their profits, is so much harder than it looks. Rachid Laajaj (Universidad de los Andes) and Karen Macours (Paris School of Economics) tell Tim Phillips about an experiment in Kenya in which farmers ran trial plots on their own land for three seasons, comparing input combinations side by side, and were followed for five seasons more. Farmers adopted the new inputs and their profits fell. But they kept experimenting anyway, season after season, until the losses became gains. The most skilled farmers went first, made the most mistakes, and paid the highest price; their neighbours watched, copied, and adopted at a fraction of the cost. Each failed attempt costs a farmer a season. Lower that cost, Laajaj and Macours argue, and you change what is possible for millions of farming households. The research behind this episode: Laajaj, Rachid, and Karen Macours. 2026. "The Complexity of Multidimensional Learning in Agriculture." Econometrica 94 (2): 465-503. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, Rachid Laajaj, and Karen Macours. 2026. "Why farmers struggle to adopt new agricultural technology" VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guests Rachid Laajaj is Associate Professor of Economics at Universidad de los Andes in Bogota, with research spanning technology adoption in agriculture, corruption, and human capital, studied from a micro-development perspective with particular attention to the role of information. He received his PhD in Agricultural and Applied Economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Karen Macours is a professor at the Paris School of Economics, a senior researcher at INRAE, and a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in the Development Economics programme. Her research spans agricultural productivity, rural poverty, social programmes, and early childhood development. She chairs the Standing Panel on Impact Assessment of the CGIAR and is co-editor of the Journal of Development Economics. Research and concepts cited in this episode The trials. In 48 randomly selected villages in Kenya, ten farmers per village were invited to run a three-season agronomic trial on a small parcel of their own land, guided by an agronomist. Each trial plot was divided into six subplots; five tested different combinations of modern inputs and one served as a control. The trials occupied a tiny share of each farm, so the direct economic effect was negligible; the point was the opportunity to learn. A further 48 villages served as controls, giving a sample of 960 farmers followed across six seasons of data collection. Integrated Soil Fertility Management (ISFM). The input combinations tested in the trials followed ISFM principles; a sustainable intensification approach that combines improved seed with mineral fertiliser and organic inputs, adapted to local conditions. Its logic is precisely the multidimensionality the paper studies; the components work through their combination, not in isolation. The International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) provided the agronomists who guided farmers through the trials. The paper builds on joint work with IITA. The target-input model. The workhorse theory of learning in agriculture, in which farmers learn the optimal quantity of a single input through experience; it dates to work by Foster and Rosenzweig in 1995 and underlies much of the literature on social learning, including Conley and Udry's study of pineapple farmers in Ghana. Laajaj and Macours extend it to many interdependent inputs, where adopting one requires re-optimising the others; what Laajaj calls the curse of multidimensionality. Measuring farmer skills. The origin of this project; Laajaj and Macours spent years developing measures of farmers' cognitive, non-cognitive, and technical skills, work that circulated as CEPR Discussion Paper 13271, "Measuring Skills in Developing Countries" (gated). Asking farmers agronomic questions revealed that many had no single right answer; the answer depended on everything else the farmer was doing. Employment in agriculture. Macours notes in the episode that agriculture accounts for half of employment in sub-Saharan Africa, rising to as much as two-thirds when the wider agro-food sector is included. Conservation agriculture. A prominent example of a knowledge-intensive sustainable practice; it combines minimal tillage, crop rotation, and the retention of crop residues, so a farmer must learn several new practices at once and find a combination that works. More VoxDev Talks episodes African agriculture's underappreciated supply side. Hope Michelson on the other half of the adoption puzzle; the markets and firms that supply seeds, fertilisers, and pesticides to smallholders. Strengthening climate resilience in agriculture. Tavneet Suri on how small-scale farmers respond to extreme weather, and the seed varieties that protect crops against floods and droughts. Combining improved seed varieties and index insurance to address drought losses. Paswel Marenya on a trial in Mozambique and Tanzania that paired drought-resistant seeds with insurance. Related reading on VoxDev Agricultural Technology in Africa, the VoxDevLit surveying the evidence on what drives, and blocks, technology adoption by African farmers. Improving agricultural extension and information services in the developing world, drawing lessons from nearly fifty randomised evaluations of constraints on smallholder productivity. Encouraging agricultural technology adoption through autonomy: evidence from Mexico, on how giving farmers ownership of the adoption process makes new practices stick. Harnessing the benefits of digital agriculture for smallholder farmers in East Africa, on text-message-based extension programmes evaluated in Kenya and Rwanda.

  • S7 · E33
    July 1 · 29 min

    S7 Ep33: Interpersonal violence costs the world more than war

    Wars get the headlines. A civil war can wreck a country's economy and dominate its news for a decade. But if you assume war is the most costly form of violence a society faces, you would be wrong. In this week's VoxDev Talk, James Fearon (Stanford) joins Tim Phillips to argue that the violence happening quietly inside homes and on ordinary streets does far more damage than war and terrorism combined. Drawing on his new book Worse Than War (PUP), written with Anke Hoeffler, Fearon estimates that interpersonal violence, meaning homicide, intimate partner violence and severe physical abuse of children, kills and injures more people than war, and costs society more too. Large-scale collective violence hits very few countries in any year. Almost every country carries rates of homicide and assault that exceed the global average for war. Fearon's argument is not that war does not matter. It is that the interpersonal violence is less dramatic and often hidden from view. There is evidence on what works to reduce it, but we aren't giving the problem the attention it needs. The book behind this episode: Hoeffler, Anke, and James D. Fearon. 2026. Worse than War: The Global Costs of Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and James Fearon. 2026. "Interpersonal violence costs the world more than" VoxDev Talk (podcast). About James Fearon James Fearon is the Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences and professor of political science at Stanford University, and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. His research spans civil and interstate war, ethnic conflict, the international spread of democracy, the evaluation of foreign aid and institution building, and the costs of collective and interpersonal violence. He was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 2012 and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2002. The book is co-authored with Anke Hoeffler, professor of development research at the University of Konstanz and co-author of Breaking the Conflict Trap, whose work on the economics of civil war includes the influential conflict-trap research with Paul Collier. Research and concepts discussed in this episode Interpersonal versus collective violence. The book distinguishes collective violence, perpetrated by organised groups such as states, rebel organisations, terrorists, or criminal gangs, from interpersonal violence, committed by individuals. Interpersonal violence is broken down into homicide, intimate partner violence, and severe physical abuse of children. The central finding is that the average annual cost of interpersonal violence is far larger than that of interstate and civil war, somewhere between five and 20 times larger, with a best estimate of about eight times. Prevalence, not intensity. The reason interpersonal violence costs more in aggregate is that it is far more widespread. Very few countries experience large-scale collective violence in any given year, but almost all countries carry annual death and injury rates from homicide, intimate partner violence, and child abuse that exceed global average war death and injury rates. For 2000 to 2019, the authors estimate a global annual average of not quite 1.5 deaths per 100,000 people from war and terrorism, against about 7 per 100,000 for homicide. Intimate partner violence. The authors estimate global annual averages of about 3,300 and 1,600 per 100,000 people for intimate partner physical and sexual assault respectively, which is roughly twice those rates for women specifically. Severe physical abuse of children. Measured conservatively, capturing beatings far more serious than a mild spanking, the estimates imply that 15% of children aged 14 or younger are subjected to monthly beatings that would be classed as assaults if the victims were adults. Economic costs versus well-being costs. Civil war can cause severe economic devastation in the worst-affected countries, mainly through reduced growth, and at the global level the strictly economic costs of collective violence may exceed those of interpersonal violence. But economic loss is only one cost. Drawing on methods that use what people pay to avoid risks of death or injury, the authors estimate well-being losses that are far greater for interpersonal violence, because it kills and injures so many more people each year. The authors note that the difficulty of estimating the economic cost of interpersonal violence means their figures probably understate it relative to collective violence. Why interpersonal violence stays invisible. National media and political debate focus far more on collective violence, partly because it is dramatic and episodic while interpersonal violence is persistent and, happening inside households, often practically invisible. Sustained public and policy attention on the scale of interpersonal violence is itself a step towards reducing its costs. It is not just "culture". Against the view that little can be done because interpersonal violence is cultural, the authors point to a broad range of programmes and policies with evidence behind them. For homicide and intimate partner violence, measures that reduce alcohol access and consumption. For intimate partner violence and child abuse, adolescent dating programmes and parenting programmes. Across all forms, police reform to improve accountability and training, and more police in countries with low ratios of police to homicides. Reducing collective violence. There is reasonable evidence that UN peacekeeping operations are a relatively inexpensive way to lower violence in civil war countries and to reduce the chance of war resuming after a peace agreement. The authors note that rising conflict among the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, and sharpening regional rivalries among larger states in conflict-affected areas, have sharply reduced the prospects for new peacekeeping operations for now.

  • S7 · E32
    June 24 · 20 min

    S7 Ep32: Courts in the Global South

    How do courts work when they work well? You would expect them to be impartial, neutral, and consistent. In much of the Global South that is a tall order. So when courts fall short of it, are they failing? Development institutions ask states to build strong courts on the North American and Western European model. Good governance follows, they argue. This model treats poorer, less democratic systems as deviations from a norm rather than as institutions doing different work. Fiona Shen-Bayh (University of Maryland) joins Tim Phillips to review the evidence on what courts in the Global South actually do, and who they help. Where the state is weak, customary elders, NGOs, even rebel groups step in to adjudicate, and people often trust these forums more than the state's own courts. Taliban courts in Afghanistan upheld due process during civil war. Dictators sometimes build genuinely independent courts, because property rights attract investment and citizens' lawsuits tell the centre what local officials are doing. The research behind this episode: Rios-Figueroa, Julio, and Fiona Shen-Bayh. 2025. "Courts in the Global South." Annual Review of Political Science 28. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Fiona Shen-Bayh. 2026. "Courts in the Global South." VoxDev Talks (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE. About the guest Fiona Shen-Bayh is Assistant Professor of Government and Politics, with a joint appointment at the College of Information Studies, at the University of Maryland. Her research spans authoritarian regimes, judicial politics, and the use of legal and judicial institutions as instruments of power, often drawing on digitised archives and text-as-data methods. Her book Undue Process: Persecution and Punishment in Autocratic Courts (Cambridge University Press) won the APSA-IPSA Theodore J. Lowi First Book Award, the Giovanni Sartori Book Award, and the Juan Linz Best Book Prize. The paper is co-authored with Julio Rios-Figueroa, Professor in the Department of Law at the Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM), whose work spans comparative judicial politics, the rule of law, and empirical legal studies, with a focus on Latin America. Research cited in this episode The triad logic of conflict resolution. Drawn from Martin Shapiro's Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (1981). A court is effective when two parties appeal to a third to settle their dispute, and three conditions hold: the parties believe the third party is impartial; the third party is neutral, not predisposed to favour either side; and the rationale for the decision is consistent with existing norms, the idea of precedent. The review deliberately relaxes the assumption that courts are effective only when all three conditions are met. The rule of law revival. The wave of good-governance programmes promoted by the United States and Western European governments and NGOs after the fall of the Soviet Union, presenting strong courts as a remedy for corruption, instability, and tyranny in the Global South. The fallacy of legalism. The belief that creating law through statute, legislation, or precedent is enough to bring about social change. The phrase, from Sandra Joireman's work on property rights in Africa, names a habit of thought rooted in the Western experience, where the state has historically enforced property rights and contracts. In much of the Global South the absence of the state does not mean the absence of rules and order. Stateness. The extent to which a state exercises authority across its territory: its monopoly on violence in the classic Weberian sense, but also the creation of law and the administration of public affairs. Where stateness is low, non-state actors fill the judicial vacuum. Taliban and Islamic State courts. Recent fieldwork-based research finds that Sharia courts run by the Taliban in Afghanistan upheld notable degrees of due process and impartiality, offering predictability during civil war, and that the coercion associated with the Taliban featured in only a minority of the cases their courts heard. Courts in authoritarian regimes. A growing literature shows what courts do for dictators: establish credible property rights that attract foreign capital; monitor administrative conflict, as in China, where citizens' grievances against the state feed information upward to the centre; and, at other times, repress opponents or legitimise the regime by delivering popular moral outcomes even against the letter of the law. Political competition and judicial independence. Electoral competition can sustain independent courts in healthy democracies, partly because divided governments struggle to coordinate against unfavourable rulings. Under instability or an expected change of regime, the relationship can reverse: incumbents pack courts to entrench their interests before leaving, and judges may rule strategically to align with whoever they expect to hold power next, a pattern visible across Latin America. Access to justice and legal mobilisation. Social transformation through courts depends on people developing a "legal conscience", an understanding of the law and how to use it, and on support structures outside the judiciary: civil society organisations, bar associations, prosecutors, lawyers, and human rights groups that help citizens bring and sustain claims. Courts and democratic backsliding. Courts hold neither the purse nor the sword, which makes them easy targets for hostile rhetoric, legislative threats, pressure to resign, and court-packing. Courts that are neither impartial nor neutral can still stabilise a democracy while rival parties remain uncertain of each other's intentions, provided both still accept competitive elections. Once a party, especially an incumbent, abandons that commitment, there is little a court can do alone. Digitised judicial data. The digitisation and free publication of court records across the Global South has opened large-scale, fine-grained study of everyday jurisprudence, useful to scholars and to the judges, lawyers, and litigants who can now see how the law works in their own context.

  • S7 · E31
    June 18 · 31 min

    S7 Ep31: Nonelite Women's Participation in Politics

    The usual way to measure women's power in politics is to count the seats they hold in parliament. But most women who take part in politics never stand for office. They vote, attend meetings, petition, protest, or try to get the water supply fixed. In this week's VoxDev Talk, Soledad Artiz Prillaman of Stanford talks to Tim Phillips about her new review of the research into non-elite women's participation in politics, written with Peace Medie (University of Bristol). They are not elite women with less money, she argues. They want different things and face different constraints. Social norms can prevent them from achieving the change they want. But in the Global South there is evidence that non-elite women are using collective action to gain access to politics, and using that access to renegotiate the norms that hold them back, rather than waiting for those norms to shift first. The research behind this episode: Medie, Peace A., and Soledad Artiz Prillaman. 2026. "Nonelite Women's Participation in Politics." Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 29. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Soledad Artiz Prillaman. 2026. "Nonelite Women's Participation in Politics." VoxDev Talks (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE. About the guest Soledad Artiz Prillaman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and faculty director of the Inclusive Democracy and Development Lab. Her research spans comparative political economy, development, and gender, with a focus on South Asia and on how and when women gain access to politics, both as citizens and as representatives. She is the author of The Patriarchal Political Order: The Making and Unraveling of the Gendered Participation Gap in India (Cambridge University Press, 2023). The paper is co-authored with Peace A. Medie, Associate Professor in the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University of Bristol. Her work covers gender, security, and politics in Africa, including the campaigns to end violence against women. Research cited in this episode Elite and nonelite women. The paper defines eliteness by access to political power, not by office held or income alone. Elites include elected representatives, but also academics and business executives whose position gives them access to power. Nonelites are those who lack that access. The distinction matters because policy aimed at getting more women into elite positions only helps everyone else if elite and nonelite women want the same things, and the evidence that they do is thin. The income puzzle. At the individual level, income is generally uncorrelated with women's turnout; at the national level, GDP predicts nonelite women's participation only in some places. Women in paid work do participate more, but the driver appears to be the networks and information that come with a job, not the wage. Vote agency. Showing up to vote is not the same as voting freely. Asked whether they would vote for their own preferred party or the one a male gatekeeper preferred, at least half of women in some South Asian settings say they would defer. Work by Sara Khan shows that the women with the least agency are those whose preferences differ most from the men who hold power over them. Varieties of patriarchy. All societies are patriarchal, but patriarchy operates differently across them. In parts of South Asia it takes the form of explicit, socially sanctioned control over where women go and how they vote. In the United States and Europe it shows up earlier, as socialisation, producing large gender gaps in stated political interest. Same underlying force, different mechanics, different policy conclusions. Quotas. More than 100 countries have adopted some form of electoral gender quota, making it the most widespread women's empowerment policy in the world. The evidence on whether quotas help nonelite women is mixed; they raise some women's participation in some places, but in others the effect is null or negative. In India, Prillaman notes campaign material for quota seats that pairs the woman candidate's name with a man's photograph. Collective action. Networks outside the home, through women's groups, microcredit groups, churches, unions or friendship circles, raise women's participation by widening their information and giving them cover against backlash. Prillaman argues that in the Global South women are increasingly using collective action to gain access to politics, and using that access to renegotiate norms, rather than waiting for norms to change first. More from VoxDev Where are the Indian female politicians?, an interview with Lakshmi Iyer on why a woman winning office in India does not lead to more women standing next time. Related reading on VoxDev Grassroots party activism by women promotes equal political participation, in which Tanushree Goyal finds that women politicians in Delhi recruit women activists, narrowing gender gaps in political knowledge and participation. Women's microcredit groups empower women politically, in which Prillaman shows that microcredit groups raise women's political participation in India by building their networks, not their bank balances.

  • S7 · E30
    June 10 · 22 min

    S7 Ep30: The end of aid dependency

    This episode follows a wide-ranging panel convened at Stanford's King Center on Global Development, featuring Gyude Moore, as well as Gates Foundation CEO Mark Suzman, former USAID Administrator and Ambassador Mark Green, and Chair and Founder of the Liquidity and Sustainability Facility Vera Songwe - The future of global development: Approaches and partnerships for a new reality. Bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa will fall by between 16% and 28% this year, according to the IMF. In past downturns, multilateral and humanitarian funding tended to fill the gap when bilateral aid dropped. This time those channels are shrinking too. Gyude Moore, who ran the Liberian President's Delivery Unit under Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, thinks the contraction is structural rather than a passing effect of the Trump administration, and that recipient countries should stop expecting the old arrangement to return. He wants economic growth put at the centre of development rather than treated as one programme among several. Instead of letting donors decide which programmes are run, he says, countries should run a growth diagnostic: a way of identifying the two or three constraints doing most to hold an economy back. Governments can then reorganise their budgets around removing those constraints, and use the diagnostic to decide which offers of aid to take and which to turn down. Moore calls this “sovereignty through analytics”. Aid was meant to be temporary, he argues, and the job now is to quickly reach the point of not needing it. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and W. Gyude Moore. 2026. "The end of aid dependency.” VoxDev Talks (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE. About the guest W. Gyude Moore is a distinguished fellow at the Energy for Growth Hub and a non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development. He was Liberia's minister of public works from December 2014 to January 2018, and before that deputy chief of staff to President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and head of the President's Delivery Unit, which oversaw more than $1 billion of road, power and port projects in a country rebuilding after civil war. He also lectures at the University of Chicago's Harris School of Public Policy. His work covers African infrastructure, energy, industrial policy and development finance. Cited in this episode The scale of the cuts. The IMF's October 2025 Regional Economic Outlook for sub-Saharan Africa, using OECD figures, projects bilateral aid to the region falling by 16% to 28% in 2025, with more cuts likely. Moore says the cuts to multilateral and humanitarian funding run higher again, and that the most aid-dependent countries have been hit hardest, through weaker health, education and nutrition systems. Growth diagnostics. A way of finding the constraints that matter most: the one or two that, once removed, allow others to ease. Moore likens it to a doctor running tests before prescribing. The method is associated with the Growth Lab at Harvard. He suggests governments hire an independent party to run the analysis, so the findings cannot be dismissed as political. The Millennium Challenge Corporation. A US agency that runs what it calls a constraints analysis, then funds the removal of the constraint it finds. Moore offers it as an existing model for diagnostic-led aid, while noting that it has critics. Sovereignty through analytics. Moore's phrase for using a credible diagnostic to set the terms with donors. A government can say what it is trying to do, ask for help where it needs it, and decline what does not fit. He points to Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe rejecting or walking away from US health agreements under the America First Global Health Strategy as evidence that recipient governments now have that leverage and are willing to use it. The Development Alliance. Liberia's attempt, around 2014 and 2015, to bring every donor and NGO into one room to map who was doing what, spot duplication and find the sectors nobody was covering. Moore's assessment: useful, but voluntary, not written into law, and not built around a single diagnostic. His conclusion is that such a framework should be put on a legal footing. Five-year plans. Moore, who teaches in China each autumn, points to the discipline that fixed planning periods impose, and argues that legislation can do a similar job of holding a development strategy steady across changes of government. Delivery units. Small teams set up to push complex projects through where the wider bureaucracy cannot. Moore ran one in the Liberian presidency and calls them islands of competence; he offers them as a way around weak implementation. The European politics of aid. Moore's reason for thinking the window may close. Nativist parties are gaining ground across Europe, from the AfD to Reform UK to the PVV in the Netherlands, and an ageing population will pull more public money homeward. Countries that do not adjust, he warns, may find the external funding gone.

  • S7 · E29
    June 3 · 29 min

    S7 Ep29: What the $1-a-day global poverty line gets wrong

    It's 1990. A young staff economist walks into a director's office at the World Bank and says the number he's about to publish is "crazy". The director tells him not to worry about it. The number was the dollar-a-day poverty line. Lant Pritchett, now of LSE, was that economist. More than three decades later, he's still worrying about it. In this week’s episode he argues that the dollar-a-day line warped how the world thinks about poverty, by setting the bar so low that we can count billions of deprived people as not poor. In a new paper, co-authored with Martina Viarengo (Graduate Institute, Geneva), their fix isn't to scrap the low line. It's to add a high one as well. They propose a global upper-bound poverty line of $21.50 a day, ten times the extreme-poverty standard, derived from four separate measures of material wellbeing. Above it, you're no longer poor by any reasonable global standard. Below it, you're poor in a sense worth measuring. By that standard, 99% of Pakistan is poor, and almost no one in Denmark is. Should that affect how we think about anti-poverty policy? The research behind this episode: Pritchett, Lant, and Martina Viarengo. Forthcoming. "Raising the Bar: An Inclusive Global Poverty Line." Journal of Development Economics. Available now as a working paper. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Lant Pritchett. 2026. "What the $1-a-day global poverty line gets wrong." VoxDev Talks (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE. About the guest Lant Pritchett is a development economist and Visiting Professor at the School of Public Policy at the London School of Economics. He worked at the World Bank from 1988 to 2007 and taught at the Harvard Kennedy School for nearly two decades. His work spans economic growth, state capability, education systems, and labour mobility. The paper is co-authored with Martina Viarengo, Professor of International Economics at the Geneva Graduate Institute. Her research spans public policy, labour markets, comparative education, and international migration. Research cited in this episode The dollar-a-day poverty line. Created for the World Bank's 1990 World Development Report on poverty and based on the observation that national poverty lines in the poorest countries clustered at a low floor (Ravallion, Datt and van de Walle 1991). Updated for inflation, it now sits at P$2.15 a day in 2017 purchasing power parity. It was only ever meant to mark the lowest a global poverty line could plausibly be, not the line. The focus axiom. A standard property of poverty measures, originating with Amartya Sen (1976), under which changes in the income of anyone above the poverty line do not register in the measure. Pritchett's objection is that this assigns mathematically zero weight to the near-poor; a household just above the line counts the same as a Danish millionaire, namely zero. He calls it an economic bug that became a political feature, because it takes global redistribution off the table. Gresham's law applied to poverty. Pritchett's framing for how the simple headcount displaced richer, distribution-sensitive approaches; bad economics drove out better economics because it was easier to understand. He notes the World Bank of the 1970s was preoccupied with distribution, citing Hollis Chenery and Montek Ahluwalia's Redistribution with Growth (1974), so the idea that economists ignored distribution until poverty measurement arrived is a myth. The two criteria for an upper bound. The proposed line rests on two ideas drawn from the tension between the focus axiom and standard welfare economics. One, material wellbeing achievement; the line sits where a household reaches a standard of living a rich-country citizen would recognise as adequate. Two, near enough satiation; the line sits where the extra wellbeing from another dollar has fallen so low that treating further gains as zero does little violence to reality. At twenty-one and a half dollars the marginal utility of income is roughly three percent of its value at the dollar-a-day line; at the World Bank's current high line of P$6.85 it is still around thirty percent. Four measures of wellbeing. The number is triangulated across an iso-elastic utility function, food shares in consumption (Engel's Law), a household index of six basic conditions drawn from Demographic and Health Survey data, and a cross-national index of basics. The estimates cluster between twenty and forty dollars a day; twenty-one and a half was chosen because it is exactly ten times the dollar-a-day line, a focal point in the same way one dollar was. The six minimal conditions of prosperity. Electricity, improved sanitation, safe water, primary schooling completed by older children, no child dying under five, and no young child malnourished. The test Pritchett applies is whether it would be absurd to call a household prosperous while it lacks one of them. The rich of the poor and the poor of the rich. The tenth percentile in Denmark has higher consumption than the ninetieth percentile in Pakistan or Indonesia. This is why any global line that produces meaningful poverty in rich countries implies poverty rates near one hundred percent across most of the developing world; a point Dani Rodrik (2007) showed is widely misunderstood. The prosperity gap. A distribution-sensitive welfare measure adopted by the World Bank (Kraay et al. 2025) that weights the whole income distribution rather than counting everyone above a threshold as zero. Pritchett offers it, alongside poverty-gap and squared-poverty-gap measures at a higher line, as the practical route to acting on a global upper bound without reducing everything to a single headcount. More VoxDev Talks episodes Rethinking evidence and refocusing on growth in development economics, Lant Pritchett on what the problem might be if we rely exclusively on rigorous evidence in development economics as a guide for policy. Rethinking how we measure extreme poverty, Charles Kenny asks: is it time for a new measure of extreme poverty?

  • S7 · E28
    May 27 · 37 min

    S7 Ep28: Why civil service reform fails (and what actually works)

    Every civil service reform plan opens with the same list of complaints: poor performance, low motivation, weak accountability. Across six African countries and three decades, governments launched 131 separate reform efforts; not one fully achieved what it set out to do. Martin Williams spent more than a decade working alongside Ghana's civil service before writing a book called Reform as Process that analyses the lessons from his experience, and the rest of the 131 reforms. For example, 34 programmes across six countries tried to link civil service pay to performance; none delivered. One lesson is that formal rules and accountability systems cannot govern what matters in a civil service: innovation, adaptation, co-ordination, the willingness to act on the spirit of a rule rather than its letter. Meaningful reforms often require no money at all. They require changing expectations from inside, starting small and building credibility, decentralising the leadership of change, and treating new formal rules as a last resort rather than a first step. The book behind this episode: Williams, Martin J. 2026. Reform as Process: Implementing Change in Public Bureaucracies. New York: Columbia University Press. Open-access PDF available at uplopen.com. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Martin J. Williams. 2026. "Why civil service reform fails (and what actually works)." VoxDev Talks (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE. About the guest Martin J. Williams is Associate Professor of Organizational Studies and Associate Professor (by courtesy) of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, and Associate Faculty at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford. His research spans the politics and management of policy implementation, public service delivery, and bureaucratic reform, with a sustained focus on sub-Saharan Africa. He previously worked as an economist in Ghana's Ministry of Trade and Industry as an Overseas Development Institute Fellow, and as a Senior Researcher at the Economic Policy Research Institute in Cape Town. Reform as Process has been shortlisted for the Douglass North Award for best book in institutional and organizational economics. Research cited in this episode Non-verifiable tasks. In organizational economics, a verifiable action is one where a third party (an auditor, a judge, an administrative tribunal) can determine objectively whether it was performed correctly. Non-verifiable tasks are those where no such determination can be made; they include innovation, adaptation, co-ordination across teams, and acting on the spirit of a rule rather than its letter. Williams draws on this framework, which originates in contract theory, to explain why formal accountability systems consistently fall short: they can only govern verifiable outputs, leaving the full range of non-verifiable tasks unaddressed and, in many cases, actively crowded out. Performance-linked incentive systems. Williams's dataset covers 34 separate reform efforts across Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Zambia that attempted to tie civil service pay or progression to measured performance. Not one delivered sustained differentiated incentives on an ongoing basis; only two achieved even partial delivery of rewards, and none delivered sanctions based on measured performance. Williams argues this is not isolated implementation failure but reflects a structural incompatibility between formalised performance metrics and the non-verifiable nature of much civil service work. Managers respond rationally: they set soft targets, award uniform scores, and the process becomes a tick-box exercise. Projectization of reform. Williams uses this term to describe the dominant approach: treating change as a time-bound, discrete intervention with its own budget, acronym, and implementing team, conceived separately from the organisation's core work. This approach systematically distorts reform goals towards formally measurable outputs (new policies, new laws) rather than sustained behavioural change, undermines credibility by signalling a predetermined end date, and reinforces the perception among civil servants that reform is a temporary performance before things return to normal. Continuous improvement. Williams draws an analogy with physical fitness: achieving a target and then stopping does not sustain the gain. High-performing organisations, in the public and private sectors alike, treat improvement as an ongoing process embedded in daily work, not a periodic project handed to a specialist unit. Starting small is not an absence of ambition; it is how credibility is built and larger changes become possible. Williams argues civil service reform should be reconceived on these terms, with performance improvement treated as the job of everyone in the organisation. Decentralised reform leadership. The dominant model of reform leadership, Williams argues, is a visionary leader driving a top-down plan. This model is counterproductive. It personalises reform in ways that guarantee reversal when the leader moves on, and it cannot reach the day-to-day interactions among the thousands of individuals and hundreds of teams that determine how a civil service actually works. A more effective model is catalysing rather than forcing: creating conditions in which teams can identify and solve their own problems, escalate issues, co-ordinate with each other, and act on ideas for improvement without fear of being ignored or penalised. More VoxDev Talks episodes How government analytics can improve public sector implementation, in which Daniel Rogger and Christian Schuster discuss their efforts to use the data that already exists in governments to better understand how they function.

  • S7 · E27
    May 20 · 26 min

    S7 Ep27: The World Bank's East Asian Miracle

    In 1993, the World Bank published a report on a remarkable development story. East Asia's post-war growth — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and their neighbours — had lifted millions out of poverty in a generation. The report documented the influence of export subsidies, state-directed credit, land reform, and government-business dialogue. But the bank, constrained by the Washington Consensus of the time, underplayed the industrial policies that were at the heart of this miracle. Nancy Birdsall was head of the department that produced the report. In this week's VoxDev Talk, she looks back, talking to Tim Phillips about whether this stance affected policy in other developing countries. Birdsall tells Tim Phillips how the report came to exist at all — financed by the Japanese government as a deliberate strategy to expose the bank's economists to a success story their prevailing framework couldn't explain. With industrial policy back at the centre of economic debate, Birdsall's new article in the Journal of Economic Perspectives asks whether the bank missed its moment to embed those lessons into its operational work. The research behind this episode: Birdsall, Nancy. 2025. "The World Bank's East Asian Miracle: Too Much a Product of Its Time?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 39(4): 127–48. A free download is available at the Center for Global Development. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Nancy Birdsall. 2026. "The World Bank's East Asian Miracle." VoxDev Talk (podcast). [Episode URL]. Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE. About Nancy Birdsall Nancy Birdsall is president emerita of the Center for Global Development, which she co-founded in 2001. She was previously executive vice president of the Inter-American Development Bank and, before that, director of the Policy Research Department at the World Bank, where she oversaw the department responsible for the East Asian Miracle report. Her research spans development finance, inequality, economic growth and the role of multilateral institutions in the global economy. Research cited in this episode The East Asian Miracle (World Bank, 1993). A 400-page study of the economic performance of eight high-performing Asian economies — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand — covering the period 1965 to 1990. Commissioned with Japanese government funding, the report documented both market fundamentals and a range of active state policies; its handling of industrial policy was carefully hedged to remain within the bounds of what the bank's dominant Washington Consensus framework could accept. The full report is available from the World Bank Open Knowledge Repository. The Washington Consensus. A term coined by economist John Williamson in 1989 to describe the package of macroeconomic and structural reforms — fiscal discipline, trade liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation and market-determined prices — that the IMF, World Bank and US Treasury broadly promoted as the framework for development in the late 1980s and 1990s. The consensus was dominant inside the bank during the period the East Asian Miracle report was written; countries following activist state policies did not fit its categories easily. MITI (Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry). The Japanese government body responsible for coordinating industrial and trade policy during Japan's post-war growth period, including the direction of credit, protection of infant industries and promotion of heavy manufacturing exports. MITI was widely known inside the bank, but its role in Japan's development was not systematically studied or incorporated into the bank's policy advice until the East Asian Miracle report. It was abolished and reorganised as the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 2001. Performance-based credit subsidies. A mechanism used across several East Asian economies in which exporters could access subsidised credit conditional on demonstrating actual export orders. The conditionality — credit only if you are already performing — was central to why the policy worked: it rewarded productive firms and withdrew support from those that failed to deliver. The East Asian Miracle report described this approach in detail without classifying it as industrial policy. Japan's postal savings system. A government-run savings scheme that channelled household deposits through post offices into state-directed investment, providing below-market returns to savers while funding subsidised credit to targeted sectors. Birdsall notes it as a mechanism worth studying for developing countries seeking to finance industrial support without relying on private capital markets. Indonesia and the airplane sector. The Indonesian government under Suharto sought to develop a domestic aerospace industry, with state subsidies to Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN). The World Bank's East Asia regional department, which managed the bank's lending relationship with Indonesia, was concerned that the East Asian Miracle report might be read as endorsing this approach. Their pressure to limit the report's treatment of industrial policy is the episode's opening anecdote — and the source of what is possibly the best line in the show. IDB report on public-private dialogue in Latin America. Birdsall references work by the Inter-American Development Bank on the conditions under which structured dialogue between government bureaucrats and private-sector firms can support industrial policy; she notes that access at the highest levels of government — including the president — appears to be a factor in whether such dialogues produce results. More VoxDev Talks on this topic Industrial policy for economic development, Dani Rodrik on the evidence for active state roles in directing investment and exports, and the institutional prerequisites for making them work. The future of the World Bank: Why knowledge is power, Penny Goldberg on the bank's role as a producer and broker of development knowledge, and how that function has evolved since the Washington Consensus era. Related reading on VoxDev Modern industrial policy: The Asian miracles' blueprint, a VoxDev Talk examining how the principles behind East Asian industrial success — performance conditionality, export orientation, technology learning — can be translated into policy frameworks for today's developing economies. Where are we in the economics of industrial policies?, what three decades of research have established about when and why industrial policy works, and what conditions determine whether government intervention helps or hinders. Implementing industrial policy effectively: Lessons from shipbuilding in China, how policy design and performance conditionality determine whether sector-level support produces lasting productivity gains — the same question at the heart of the East Asian Miracle debate.

  • S7 · E26
    May 15 · 36 min

    S7 Ep26: Ed Glaeser on the perfect city and the demons of density

    This is an episode from VoxDev's new podcast series, Ideas in Development. This series has a separate podcast feed, where you can find every episode of Oliver Hanney and Kurtis Lockhart's conversations on cities. YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sjXmiaMPabQ Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-perfect-city/id1866874059?i=1000767322240 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/3MfSc3AWT6lT5jG9kvXW4B?si=371569bc3d374d72 Audioboom: https://audioboom.com/posts/8902311-the-perfect-city Substack: https://ideasindevelopment.substack.com/p/the-perfect-city What does a perfect city look like in a low- or middle-income country – and how do you get there? In the closing episode of the Ideas in Development cities series, Ed Glaeser joins Kurtis Lockhart and Oliver Hanney for a wide-ranging conversation on what makes cities work. He sets out the three foundations every city needs (safety, mobility, education), why infrastructure without the right incentives and institutions fails, what 19th-century New York's cholera outbreaks teach Lusaka about water, why “bus good, train bad” still holds, and what the medieval European city has to offer sub-Saharan Africa's fastest-growing urban regions. We also discuss the political art of being a great mayor, why "capacity eats policy as a light afternoon snack", and his three priorities for African cities over the next decade.

  • S7 · E25
    May 13 · 30 min

    S7 Ep25: Roshaneh Zafar on 30 years of microfinance and mindset change in Pakistan

    Wherever Roshaneh Zafar went in Pakistan in the early 1990s, documenting World Bank social development projects, women told her the same thing: the water and sanitation are fine, but what about economic opportunity? Zafar tells Tim Phillips how that question led her to train with Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank, and then back to Pakistan to found Kashf Foundation in 1996 — the country's first specialised microfinance institution for women. Thirty years on, Kashf serves more than one million clients, has covered six million lives through micro-health insurance, and has financed over 3,000 low-cost private schools. Zafar describes a model that long ago outgrew its Grameen origins: customised for Pakistan's diversity, run on a partnership rather than a hierarchical footing, and now embracing climate risk, ultra-poor programmes and AI-assisted credit decisions. The episode also confronts the question: Does microfinance actually empower women? Research has questioned whether it makes a difference. Zafar has ten years of longitudinal data that tells a different story, and a view on why the two bodies of evidence are not as contradictory as they appear. Research and references discussed in this episode: Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Cynthia Kinnan. 2015. "The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7(1): 22–53. Rana, Annum Ather. 2025. Evidence on the Impact of Microfinance Program on Poverty Reduction and Income Security. Kashf Foundation Focus Note Series, April To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Roshaneh Zafar. 2026. "Roshaneh Zafar on 30 years of microfinance and mindset change in Pakistan." VoxDev Talk (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE. About Roshaneh Zafar Roshaneh Zafar is the founder and managing director of Kashf Foundation, Pakistan's first specialised microfinance institution. A development economist by training, she worked at the World Bank before leaving to found Kashf in 1996 after training under Muhammad Yunus at Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Her work spans microfinance, micro-insurance, women's economic empowerment, low-cost private education and behaviour change communication. Research and context cited in this episode Grameen Bank and the Grameen model. Founded by Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh in 1983, Grameen Bank pioneered group-based lending to poor women without requiring collateral, on the premise that social accountability within borrower groups could substitute for asset security. Yunus received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. Kashf was established as a Grameen replicator but diverged significantly in its approach: hiring women loan officers from the outset, replacing the group hierarchy with a peer partnership model (using the Urdu term baji, meaning sister, for both client and staff), and adapting products for Pakistan's religious, linguistic and cultural diversity. The 2008 microfinance delinquency crisis in Pakistan. Over-indebtedness, predatory lending practices and the absence of a credit information bureau led to a sector-wide delinquency crisis in Pakistan in 2008. Following the crisis, regulators, lenders and the Pakistan Microfinance Network introduced enhanced consumer protection standards and a credit bureau to prevent multiple borrowing. Kashf now limits lending to clients with no more than two active loans from any provider. Banerjee et al. (2015) randomised controlled trial. The paper, a randomised evaluation of a microcredit expansion in Hyderabad, India by Spandana Sphoorty, found no statistically significant effect on women's empowerment, health, education or consumption over an 18-to-24-month follow-up period. It became the most-cited challenge to microfinance's development impact. Zafar's counter-argument turns on time horizon: empowerment, she argues, is a decade-scale process that short-panel RCTs cannot capture. A University of Minnesota longitudinal analysis of ten years of Kashf client data found a statistically significant positive correlation between the number of loans taken and business income, and between savings behaviour and subsequent business investment. Behaviour change communication: theater and television. Kashf has used street theater for thirty years to communicate on topics including child marriage, girls' education, reproductive health and insurance take-up. After Zafar attended a conference session on the impact of telenovelas on gender norms in Brazil and Mexico, the foundation moved into television drama production, covering topics including child sexual abuse, human trafficking and cybercrime. A child sexual abuse drama prompted a legal notice from PEMRA (the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority), which was successfully contested. The dramas are produced with a media and creative team to ensure sensitive handling of difficult subjects. The gender bond and gender sukuk. In 2005, Zafar rang the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange. The experience prompted a long-term ambition to connect micro women entrepreneurs to capital markets. Kashf subsequently issued a gender bond listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange, followed by a gender sukuk (Sharia-compliant bond) listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange — the first such instrument linking Pakistani microfinance to international Islamic capital markets. Low-cost private schools. Research by Kashf found that clients, once they had access to income, were moving their children from public to low-cost private schools; teacher absenteeism in private schools was far lower. Further research showed 70% of these schools were run by women. Kashf began financing them; it now supports over 3,000 such schools, with a requirement that girls constitute at least 50% of enrolment. More VoxDev Talks on this topic Breaking down access constraints faced by women: Experimental evidence from Pakistan, a VoxDev Talk on how removing specific barriers to vocational training take-up shifts economic participation among women in Pakistan — the supply-side complement to Kashf's demand-side model. How safe transport could unlock women's labour force participation in Pakistan, a VoxDev Talk on how mobility constraints suppress women's economic activity in urban Pakistan, and how subsidised women-only transport services can shift that. Related reading on VoxDev What have we learned about microfinance?, a VoxDev article reviewing the evidence base on microfinance impact, including the conditions under which credit does and does not produce lasting change in household welfare. Women's microcredit groups empower women politically, a VoxDev article on evidence that participation in group lending schemes produces political voice and civic engagement even when economic empowerment effects are limited. Empowering women through digital financial services, a VoxDev article on how mobile money and digital accounts give women a private, named financial identity — and what that does to their control over household resources.

  • S7 · E24
    May 8 · 55 min

    S7 Ep24: Leonard Wantchekon on youth and governance in African cities

    This is an episode from VoxDev's new podcast series, Ideas in Development. This series has a separate podcast feed, where you can find every episode of Oliver Hanney and Kurtis Lockhart's conversations on cities. YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOPG6UmOHGU Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/cities-of-opportunity-not-powder-kegs/id1866874059?i=1000766172534 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/6BoYX7rfpjn86KndCxsnyd?si=53213815c1fd4408 Audioboom: https://audioboom.com/posts/8899287-cities-of-opportunity-not-powder-kegs Substack: https://ideasindevelopment.substack.com/p/cities-of-opportunity-not-powder VoxDev: https://voxdev.org/topic/institutions-political-economy/leonard-wantchekon-youth-governance-and-africas-urban-future Are African cities a powder keg of restless youth – or the most promising place to build prosperity, peaceful politics and shared civic life? Leonard Wantchekon joins Ideas in Development to argue that African cities should be seen as a youth opportunity, not a youth problem. We discuss recent unrest in Kenya and Tanzania, his work showing that clientelism is overwhelmingly a rural phenomenon, and that deliberation and decentralisation are the institutional minimums African cities should be reaching for. Leonard then lays out what deliberation, decentralisation and a renewed urban culture could do for the next generation of African city dwellers.

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