Fixed + Floating - The Credit Podcast

Who Pays for the GPUs? How Lenders Underwrite AI Infrastructure | Ankur Patel (Ares)

Ankur Patel⁠ (Ares Credit Group) on asset-based finance for data centres, power and GPUs. A one-gigawatt data centre costs $15–20 billion to build. The GPUs and servers inside it can run $40 billion-plus, and they are the shortest-lived asset in the project. Josef Pschorn speaks with Ankur Patel about how that credit is structured so a lender is not relying on residual chip value to get repaid. Shownotes and analyis: https://www.fixedandfloating.com/⁠ Ankur Patel: Partner, Ares Credit Group (Alternative Credit). LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ankurjpatelcfa Ares Management: https://www.aresmgmt.comConnect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn ⁠https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠ | X ⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠ Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.Recorded: 11.08.2026#fixedfloating #creditmarkets #assetbasedfinance #privatecredit #gpufinancing #datacenters #aiinfrastructure

Do Restructurings Still Cut Debt? How Amend-and-Extend Took Over | Mike Harmon (Stanford GSB)

An amend-and-extend moves the maturity and leaves the leverage where it was. A debt-for-equity swap cuts the debt and dilutes the equity. The first is routine and the second is rare, and the constraint is not legal - most of the holder base cannot take the equity or does not want it. Josef Pschorn speaks with Mike Harmon of Stanford Graduate School of Business about why out-of-court restructurings extend maturities without reducing debt, and what has to be true before a company actually deleverages. Once a company is worth less than its debt, the equity is an out-of-the-money call option, so shareholders buy time and volatility rather than repair the balance sheet Without maintenance covenants, creditors cannot force a reduction in debt Most of the holder base does not want equity: CLOs have equity buckets, mutual funds have mandates, and only distressed funds want the position Creditors are not one actor - a lender hedged with CDS or a par lender who has not marked down has a different payoff from a discount buyer Private credit changed the composition of the holder base rather than the law, which is where debt-for-equity swaps are actually getting done The US has liability management at one end and Chapter 11 at the other with nothing in between, while the UK, Japan, France and China all run a lighter court-supervised path Mike Harmon: Stanford Graduate School of Business. https://www.linkedin.com/in/mike-harmon-92b130184 The Financial Restructuring Tool Set (Columbia University Press): https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-financial-restructuring-tool-set/9780231216982/ Liability Management’s Limited Runway: Corporate Restructuring Today, Mark J. Roe, Vasile Rotaru - Oxford Business Law Blog Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Recorded: 24.08.2026 #fixedfloating #creditanalysis #liabilitymanagement #distresseddebt #restructuring #privatecredit

Inside a Long/Short Credit Hedge Fund: Sizing, Shorts and LME Risk — Frits Lieuw-Kie-Song (Ironshield Capital)

A fifteen-billion-dollar manager's European analyst can look at three or four situations before the rest fail his liquidity screen. Frits Lieuw-Kie-Song runs a few hundred million and can look at hundreds. This is a full walk through how a long/short credit hedge fund is actually run. Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/how-a-longshort-credit-hedge-fund?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true Josef Pschorn speaks with Frits Lieuw-Kie-Song ofIronshield Capital about building a market-neutral high yield book: which credits are eligible, how positions get sized, when a short earns its borrow, and where the tail hedge sits. Liability management exercises now bring the mediancompany back within roughly a year, because the fee-driven process fixes the balance sheet without fixing the business. Being in the co-op group is not the same as sitting on the committee, and Frits will pass on a situation where he cannot influence how the pie is divided. A 400 million single-bond capital structure is too small to matter for a fifteen-billion manager, which is where in-depth research still earns its keep. Position size is dictated by the downside case, with a loss budget of roughly 50 basis points of the fund per position. The tail hedge is put spreads 5 to 15% out of the money, six months out, rolled regularly, written for the event where correlation goes to one. Two worked trades: Evoke after the UK online gamingtax move, bought at a 70 LTV with a takeover catalyst, and Volta Grid during the data centre construction scare. Ironshield Capital: https://ironshieldcapital.com/ Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedInhttps://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | Xhttps://twitter.com/FixedFloating Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only.Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Recorded: 27.07.2026 #fixedfloating #creditanalysis #highyield#longshortcredit #liabilitymanagement #europeancredit

Illiquidity in Private Credit: Why a $25M Loan Takes Six Weeks to Sell | Alex Cordover (Tradable)

Private credit has grown to roughly $2 trillion, but selling a single position remains a manual, bilateral process. Exiting a $25 million loan means NDAs, a data room, agent and borrower consents, and bespoke documentation — four to six weeks from decision to settlement, if a buyer is found at all. Full analysis: [INSERT SUBSTACK LINK] Josef Pschorn speaks with Alex Cordover, CEO of Tradable, about the exact mechanics of private credit secondaries — what happens between the decision to sell and settlement, and what a functioning secondary market requires. The full transfer anatomy: NDA, data room (loan tape, financials, original IC memo), non-binding IOI, consents, documentation, settlement Participation vs assignment: in a default, participation rights typically run against the seller, not the borrower Marks vs prices: every deal closed on Tradable has printed at par plus a buyer's premium, while valuation lag persists in software and direct-lending books Why trades die: information asymmetry and GPs unused to working together — not asset quality Where liquidity comes first: asset-backed, equipment and real estate finance before bespoke unitranche and distressed names Guest links: https://tradable.xyz | https://www.linkedin.com/in/alex-cordover-72a0a276 Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Recorded: 15.07.2026 #privatecredit #privatecreditsecondaries #creditmarkets #fixedincome #assetbackedfinance

Stress in MicroStrategy’s Preferreds: Why the Doom Loop Didn’t Happen | Mark Palmer (StoneX)

MicroStrategy’s preferred shares dropped more than 20% over a few weeks. Then an 8-K reversed the mood, handingthe company buyback authority over both its preferred and common stock for the first time. The headlines focused on a small Bitcoin sale; the more important story was buried underneath it. Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/stretch-is-not-cash-the-lesson-from?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web Josef Pschorn speaks with Mark Palmer of Benchmark-StoneX, the first Wall Street analyst to cover Strategy, about how the company’s capital structure actually holds together and what genuinely changed. Key takeaways: The 8-K gave Strategy “two-way capital management” for the first time — the ability to buy backpreferred and common stock, not just issue new securities to buy Bitcoin. Perpetual preferred stock behaves like near-permanent capital: no maturity wall, not dilutive while outstanding, and tax-advantaged as return of capital for as long as the company posts no positive net income. The recent Stretch selloff was driven by forced deleveraging among investors who had levered the position, not by any change in the Bitcoin backing the instrument. A common misconception — that a falling Stretch price increases Strategy’s cash dividend obligation — is simply wrong; the dollar obligation is fixed regardless ofprice. Strategy’s $6.75 billion convertible debt carries a blended coupon of just 0.52%, with the real risk being the 2028–2032 maturity wall rather thaninterest expense. Guest links: https://www.benchmarkcompany.com/leaders/1601/ Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedInhttps://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | Xhttps://twitter.com/FixedFloating Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Recorded: 01.07.2026

Big Market Delusion: Why Private Credit Is AI’s Biggest Loser | Aswath Damodaran (NYU)

Each AI company can price itself on an internally consistent story about winning its market. Sum those stories and the implied revenues exceed any market that could exist — the big market delusion. Aswath Damodaran puts a ceiling on it: $142 trillion in global revenues last year against $20–25 trillion in employee costs, which makes the $26 trillion addressable market in SpaceX’s IPO pitch fiction. The sharper question for credit investors is who absorbs the loss when it corrects. Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/financing-the-big-market-delusion?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true Josef Pschorn speaks with Aswath Damodaran of NYU Stern about valuing the AI boom, the corporate life cycle, and why the credit side of the build-out carries the asymmetric risk. Key takeaways: ​The biggest loser when the delusion corrects is private credit, not equity — lenders carry the downside without the upside, and “you can’t make interest payments withpotential and promise.” ​Financing should act its age: young companies should use converts or no debt; default risk belongs in the cash flows (value the firm twice, weight by survival probability), not in an inflated discount rate. ​In distress, equity is a call and debt is a put — a passive lender in a levered company is short an option whose variance the equity holder controls. Connect with Aswath Damodaran: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ | X https://x.com/AswathDamodaran Connect with Fixed + Floating: https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | Xhttps://twitter.com/FixedFloating Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Recorded: 15.06.2026#fixedfloating #creditmarkets #privatecredit #valuation #Damodaran

Distress in Auto Suppliers: Why Operational Fixes No Longer Work | Steiner (PWC) & Hauke (Willkie)

A third of Europe’s auto suppliers now sit in the distressed zone, and the share has barely moved in two years. Thesector has stopped behaving like a set of single restructuring cases and started behaving like a structural problem — one where operational stabilization no longer fixes the credit story. Full written analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/the-autosupplier-problem-that-refinancing?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web Josef Pschorn speaks with Daniel Steiner of PwC and Dr. Hendrik Hauke of Willkie Farr & Gallagher about whyEuropean auto-supplier distress has become structural, and how the restructuring toolkit actually gets used when it does. Key takeaways: 40% of automotive CEOs expect their company not to last ten years on the current path; 33% of Europeansuppliers are already distressed. The binding constraint is the cost ofcapital — German suppliers carry the highest interest-to-EBIT ratio of anyregion. Europe runs 25–30% overcapacity and China around 50%, making consolidation, not refinancing, the real cure. LEONI’s StaRUG delevered successfully the balance sheet Guest links: PwC https://www.pwc.de | Willkie https://www.willkie.com Fixed + Floating: ⁠https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠⁠ | ⁠⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠⁠ | ⁠⁠https://fixedfloating.substack.com/⁠⁠ This podcast is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Recorded: 04 June 2026. #fixedfloating #creditmarkets #autosuppliers #restructuring #distresseddebt

HY Building Materials: Why It’s Really One Housing Trade | Andy Belton (Creditsights)

US high-yield building products are a leveraged play on the US housing cycle dressed up across ten different tickers — and the concurrent distress in Cornerstone, JELD-WEN, Old Castle, and USLBM is the proof. Full written analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/one-housing-trade-ten-tickers-the?r=718tew&utm_medium=ios Andy Belton, Senior Analyst and Head of European Basics & Infrastructure at CreditSights, joins Josef Pschorn to unpack the structural fault lines that separate heavyside (cement, aggregates, ready-mix) from lightside (windows, doors, cabinets, distribution) in credit terms — and why that distinction is now producing a wave of concurrent liability management exercises on both sides of the Atlantic. Key takeaways: ​Cement prices compounded at 4–5% annually over 20 years versus 1–3% for lumber — structural pricing power, not cycle management ​A 5% volume decline translates into a 10–20% EBITDA decline for fixed-cost light side manufacturers at today's utilization rates ​JELD-WEN carries nine times leverage with December 2027 maturities going current in December 2026 — the unsecured bonds are already pricing the shock absorber role ​Pfleiderer's Silekol drop-down — 90% equity sold to unrestricted subs, new debt raised — is the European J.Crew playbook, now deployed post-restructuring ​When sponsors reach for LMEs instead of conventional refis, they are signalling they no longer believe the cycle turns fast enough to clean up the capital structure Guest: Andy Belton is Senior Analyst and Head of European Basics & Infrastructure at CreditSights, where he has covered global building materials for over two decades. Prior to CreditSights, he spent ten years at Citigroup as Head of European Ratings Advisory and began his career at Fitch predecessor IBCA. — https://creditsights.com Fixed + Floating: https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠ | ⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠ | ⁠https://fixedfloating.substack.com/⁠ This podcast is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Recorded: 18 May 2026. #fixedfloating #creditanalysis #creditmarkets #buildingmaterials #highyield #LME #JELDWEN #CreditSights #cement #housingmarket

• Transcript

Significant Risk Transfer (SRT) Mechanics: Capital Relief, Tranching, and Cycle Risk | Frank Benhamou (Cheyne Capital)

Significant Risk Transfers have quietly grown into a $1T+ hedged market — now bigger than European CLOs — and they sit at the centre of how banks manage RWAs, capital, and CET1 ratios. Full analysis: ⁠https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/significant-risk-transfer-has-quietly?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web⁠ Josef Pschorn speaks with Frank Benhamou, Partner & Portfolio Manager and Head of SRT at Cheyne Capital, about the mechanics, pricing, and cycle behaviour of SRTs — from a $1B reference portfolio walk-through to what actually happens when defaults hit and banks can't roll their hedges. Key takeaways: A bank hedging the first 80M of a 1B corporate pool can claim ~75% capital relief once the regulator agrees significant risk has transferred. Annual SRT tranche issuance now sits around $30–35B against $350–400B of hedged portfolios, implying over $1T outstanding — larger than the European CLO market. SRTs are funded insurance in tranched format — not CDS, not CLOs — with assets remaining on the bank balance sheet and the investor stepping into a true-up / true-down loss mechanism. Returns sit at cash + 6–11%, with a triple-B-equivalent average pool rating that has been materially less volatile than CLO equity through recent stress. In a downturn, banks restructure the reference pool itself — excluding chemicals, metals, or whichever sectors are under stress — rather than only paying wider spreads. Despite the bull case, SRT does not drive loan origination at the deal level. It feeds into origination only at the macro level via freed-up capital. Frank Benhamou: https://www.linkedin.com/in/frankbenhamou Cheyne Capital: https://www.cheynecapital.com Connect with Fixed + Floating: https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | https://twitter.com/FixedFloating | https://fixedfloating.substack.com/ Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Recorded: 01.05.2026 #CreditAnalysis #FixedIncome #CorporateCredit #SignificantRiskTransfer #SRT #BankCapital #SyntheticSecuritisation #BaselIII #PrivateCredit #StructuredCredit

• Transcript

Liability Management in Software Credit: Covenant Erosion, Drop-Downs & the Xerox JV Maneuver | Sabrina Fox (Fox Legal Training)

Covenant quality is weakening at a measurable rate, and software credits are where it is going to matter most. Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/why-software-credits-are-lme-catnip?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web Josef Pschorn speaks with Sabrina Fox of Fox Legal Training about the systematic erosion of lender protections in leveraged finance documentation and why software credits sit at the intersection of weak covenants and uniquely portable assets. Key takeaways: * LBO covenant quality deteriorated from 3.33 in 2023 to 3.53 in Q1 2026, compounding on a base that had been weakening since the early 2010s — 2024 saw a record 34 LME transactions * Software IP can be transferred to unrestricted subsidiaries, valued at board discretion without independent appraisal, and licensed back the same day — making drop-downs a low-friction exercise that standard covenant packages were never designed to prevent * Xerox circumvented its own J.Crew blocker by structuring a joint venture instead of a subsidiary, exploiting the definition of "subsidiary" as >50% voting power — a maneuver ION Platform lenders should be watching closely * Two pending court cases on creditor co-ops could determine whether lenders retain their primary collective defence mechanism against LMEs in 2026 Sabrina Fox: sabrina@foxlegaltraining.com Fox Legal Training: https://foxlegaltraining.com | LinkedIn: https://linkedin.com/in/sabrinafox Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Recorded: 17.04.2026 #CreditAnalysis #FixedIncome #CorporateCredit #LiabilityManagement #SoftwareCredit #CovenantAnalysis #LeveragedFinance #DropDown #JCrewBlocker #IONPlatform #Xerox #DistressedDebt

• Transcript

Private Credit, Life Insurers, and Rating Arbitrage | Jakub Lichwa (TwentyFour AM)

A three-notch downgrade on a zero-default portfolio can more than double an insurer's capital requirement. Read the full investment breakdown on Substack: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/when-annuities-meet-private-credit?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web Catch our first deep dive with Jakub on the PE Insurance Flywheel (Episode 3): https://fixedfloating.substack.com/p/private-credits-insurance-flywheel Josef Pschorn speaks with Jakub Lichwa of TwentyFour Asset Management about how PE-backed insurers use annuities to fund private credit exposure, why offshore reinsurance creates regulatory arbitrage, and where these capital structures begin to echo pre-2008 shadow banking patterns. Key Takeaways: Rating downgrades hit capital requirements faster and harder than actual credit defaults Private placements offer an illiquidity premium that structurally matches annuity durations Asset-intensive reinsurance enables massive capital release through offshore affiliated structures State guaranty funds provide backstops today that were absent in the shadow banking era Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/the-invisible-tech-moat?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn ⁠https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠ | X ⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠ Check out Jakub's work at TwentyFour Asset Management Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Host/guest views are their own. Consult professionals before investing. #CreditAnalysis #FixedIncome #CorporateCredit #PrivateCredit #Insurance #Annuities #RegulatoryArbitrage #Reinsurance #LifeInsurance #PEInsurance

• Transcript

Software Moats & AI Capex Risk: Why Dominant Firms Stay Dominant | James Bessen (Boston University) #09

Many dominant firms may be harder to disrupt today than popular narratives suggest. Josef Pschorn speaks with James Bessen of Boston University’s Technology & Policy Research Initiative about how proprietary software creates structural advantages for incumbent issuers, why AI capex may carry more tail risk than many investors assume, and how software complexity can create hidden credit risk. Key takeaways: Proprietary software becomes a true moat when scale, data, and workflow complexity reinforce one another AI capex may be more fragile than earlier infrastructure cycles Software complexity can create regulatory and operational risks thattraditional credit analysis may miss Technology spending can act as business-model defense, not just capex Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/the-invisible-tech-moat?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web James Bessen: TPRI at BU: https://sites.bu.edu/tpri/ X: https://x.com/JamesBessen Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Recorded: 19.02.2026 #CreditAnalysis #FixedIncome #CorporateCredit #TechMoats #HighYield #ArtificialIntelligence #CompetitiveAdvantage #JamesBessen #TechCapex

• Transcript

Software Credit Below 80: Who Survives AI in a $40B Loan Market? | Alec Keblish & Matthew Hughes (9fin) #08

A growing pool of software loans is trading below 80 as the market reassesses durability, pricing power, and AI disruption risk. Josef Pschorn speaks with Alec Keblish and Matthew Hughes of 9fin about which software credits look fragile, which still have resilience, and how investors should distinguish repricing from real impairment in software credit. Key takeaways: Loans below 80 need a more differentiated framework than simple “cheap or distressed” Software business models will not be affected equally by AI Recurring revenue and switching costs still matter, but not uniformly Investors need to separate spread pain from lasting impairment risk Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/40b-below-80-a-credit-analysts-framework?r=718tew&utm_medium=ios Transcripts and analysis: https://fixedfloating.substack.com Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. #CreditMarkets #HighYield #PrivateCredit #LeveragedFinance #FixedIncome #SaaS #AIDisruption #SoftwareCredit #LBOs #PrivateEquity #CreditAnalysis #DistressedDebt #9fin #BDC #TechDebt

• Transcript

BDC Stress in Private Credit: Redemptions, PIK Risks & Valuation Pressure | John Giordano (Seaport Global) #07

Private credit’s pressure points are harder to see than its growth story. Josef Pschorn speaks with John Giordano of Seaport Global about BDC redemptions, PIK income, valuation marks, and what current stress signals may be telling investors about the broader private-credit market. Key takeaways: BDCs have become a major channel for private-credit risk Redemption pressure may matter more than many investors assume PIK income can obscure underlying borrower weakness Valuation marks deserve more scrutiny in illiquid markets Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/bdcs-and-the-private-credit-puzzle?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true Transcripts and analysis: https://fixedfloating.substack.com Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. #BDCs #PrivateCredit #PIK #BlueOwl #BlackRockBDC #CreditResearch #FixedIncome #SeaportGlobal #FixedFloating

• Transcript

High Yield's Fool's Yield Trap: Why 7.9% Returns Beat 13.9% Yields | Greg Obenshain (Verdad Capital) #06

In high yield, the highest nominal yield often produces the worst long-term result. Josef Pschorn speaks with Greg Obenshain, Partner at Verdad Capital, about why yield-chasing can damage portfolios and how a more quantitative credit framework can improve underwriting and portfolio construction. Key takeaways: The highest yields often come with the weakest outcomes Spread-chasing is not the same as good credit selection Factor-based credit frameworks can improve resilience Duration can behave like a form of known credit leverage Full analysis: ⁠https://fixedfloating.substack.com/p/why-79-returns-beat-139-yields-the⁠ Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. #QuantCredit #HighYield #FixedIncome #BondMarket #FactorInvesting #FoolsYield #CreditInvesting #VerdadCapital #GregObenshain #CreditPodcast #FixedFloating

• Transcript

INEOS Credit Deep Dive: Project One, High Yields & Refinancing Risk | Timothy Riminton (Bloomberg Intelligence) #05

INEOS has become one of the most important issuer-specific credit stories in European chemicals.Ineos Group analysis: ⁠https://fixedfloating.substack.com/p/ineos-group-holdings-all-hinges-onIneos Quattro analysis: https://fixedfloating.substack.com/p/e4-chemicals-overcapacity-crisisJosef Pschorn speaks with Timothy Riminton of Bloomberg Intelligence about Project One, leverage, legal structure, high yields, and the refinancing pressure that matters most for bondholders and credit investors.Key takeaways: Project One is central to the INEOS credit story Legal structure and entity-level differences matter High yields reflect more than just cyclical weakness Refinancing risk may still be underappreciated Transcripts and analysis: https://fixedfloating.substack.com Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. #ineos #ChemicalsOvercapacity #HighYield #CreditStress #ProjectOne #fixedfloating #creditpodcast

• Transcript

Chemicals Credit Stress: Overcapacity, Energy Shock & Refinancing Risk | Timothy Riminton (Bloomberg Intelligence) #04

Chemicals credit is facing a difficult mix of overcapacity, weak demand, and refinancing pressure.Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/e4-chemicals-overcapacity-crisis?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=trueJosef Pschorn speaks with Timothy Riminton of Bloomberg Intelligence about the sector-level credit setup, why European issuers may be especially exposed, and what chemicals may be signaling for broader high-yield and leveraged-credit markets. Key takeaways: Global overcapacity is reshaping chemicals economics Europe’s cost structure is pressuring margins and competitiveness Weak utilization can quickly erode EBITDA and credit quality Refinancing pressure may still be underappreciated in spreads Transcripts and analysis: https://fixedfloating.substack.com Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.

• Transcript

Private Credit Power Center: BDCs, Insurers & PE Capital | Jakub Lichwa (TwentyFour AM) #03

Private credit is increasingly shaped by insurers, BDCs, and private-equity-backed balance sheets rather than by direct lending alone. Full analysis: ⁠https://fixedfloating.substack.com/p/private-credits-insurance-flywheel?r=718tewJosef Pschorn speaks with Jakub Lichwa of TwentyFour Asset Management about how insurance capital, ALM constraints, and private-equity ownership are changing the structure of credit markets. Key takeaways: Insurers are central to private credit’s funding model ALM and solvency frameworks shape allocation decisions PE-backed insurers create new incentive structures Market growth may also be building hidden fragility Transcripts and analysis: https://fixedfloating.substack.com Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.

• Transcript

Shadow Defaults & Private Credit Risks in Credit Markets | Edward Altman (NYU Stern) #02

Official default rates can understate what is really happening beneath the surface of credit markets. Josef Pschorn speaks with Edward Altman, Professor Emeritus at NYU Stern and creator of the Z-Score, about shadow defaults, distressed exchanges, private credit, and the hidden stress that does not always show up in headline data. Key takeaways: Shadow defaults distort the real picture of credit-market stress Private credit may be shifting risk away from public visibility Loan defaults and bond defaults do not always tell the same story Loss severity often matters more than default-count narratives Transcripts and analysis: https://fixedfloating.substack.com Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.

• Transcript

First Brands Collapse: Chapter 11 & Distressed Credit Lessons | Jared Muroff (Octus) #01

First Brands became a case study in how stressed credit can unravel faster than many investors expect. Josef Pschorn speaks with Jared Muroff, Head of Special Situations at Octus, about what drove the collapse, how hidden financing and liquidity pressure shaped the restructuring, and why Chapter 11 complexity matters for distressed-debt investors. Key takeaways: Hidden financingcan accelerate downside Chapter 11 mechanics matter for recoveries Restructruing complexity can destroy more value than expected Distressed-credit underwriting requires more than leverage analysis Transcripts and analysis: https://fixedfloating.substack.com Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. #CreditInvesting #FinancePodcast #MacroMarkets #FixedFloating #FirstBrands #DistressedDebt