Irregular Warfare Podcast

Irregular Warfare Initiative

The Irregular Warfare Podcast explores an important component of war throughout history. Small wars, drone strikes, special operations forces, counterterrorism, proxies—this podcast covers the full range of topics related to irregular war and features in-depth conversations with guests from the military, academia, and the policy community. The podcast is a collaboration between the Modern War Institute at West Point and Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project.

Play

Open in

24 episodes
fortnightly
Avg 54 min
English

Episodes 24

Newest Oldest Longest

All20 Unplayed20 In progress0 Played0

Counted on this page — what you have heard stays on this device, so it is not something the list can be paged by.

#165
Tuesday · 55 min
War at Arm’s Length: Can Military Assistance Work?
U.S. military assistance often has a bad reputation, but it isn’t doomed to failure. This episode examines why security assistance succeeds with some partners and falls short with others, and what it takes to turn weapons and training into lasting military capability. Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles Hooper, Dr. Richard Bennet, and Dr. Alexander Noyes are the guests. Today’s episode explores how the United States can build effective military partners, drawing on Richard Bennet and Alexander Noyes’s book, War at Arm’s Length: How America Can Build Effective Partners Through Military Assistance (Yale University Press, 2026). Our guests begin by asking what effectiveness means, when security assistance advances U.S. interests, and how Washington should assess the results. Bennet and Noyes explain the book’s central argument that shared security interests and capable defense institutions make assistance more likely to succeed. The discussion then examines how far sustained assistance and personal relationships can bring partners’ interests closer together, and how much alignment is needed at the outset. Drawing on cases including Ukraine and Colombia, the guests explore the importance of partners’ willingness to reform and the limits of externally imposed change. The episode closes with recommendations for choosing partners, coordinating U.S. assistance, and sequencing support so that institutions can sustain the capabilities Washington helps provide. Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles W. Hooper is Senior Counselor at The Cohen Group and a former director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. In this role, he led the agency responsible for the sale of all US weapons, military equipment, support services, and training packages to foreign governments, which included oversight of 20,000 people globally and over $50 billion in annual sales. During his 41-year military career, he served as the Senior U.S. Defense Official in Egypt, U.S. Defense Attaché to China, and Director of Strategy, Plans, and Programs at US Africa Command and Deputy Director for Strategic Planning and Policy at US Indo-Pacific Command. He speaks fluent Mandarin and is a graduate of West Point and Harvard’s Kennedy School. Dr. Richard Bennet is a senior research associate at the Center for International and Security Studies in the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy. His work examines strategic competition and the effectiveness of defense activities, drawing on experience coordinating assessments and program evaluation at multiple U.S. combatant commands. He earned his doctorate in war studies at King’s College London and is coauthor of War at Arm’s Length. Dr. Alexander Noyes is a fellow in the Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution and coauthor of War at Arm’s Length. From 2021 to 2023, he served as a senior advisor and then deputy director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, leading efforts to evaluate security cooperation and providing policy oversight for institutional capacity building programs. He earned his doctorate at the University of Oxford. Alexandra Chinchilla is the host for this episode. Please reach out to her with any questions about the episode or IWI. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources. All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa
#164
September 1 · 51 min
Hidden Costs of Precision
Episode 164 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast grapples with the hidden costs of precision warfare, looking at how drone strikes affect civilian populations well beyond their immediate lethal footprint. Anchored in a study using twelve billion geocoded cell phone records from Yemen, the conversation explores how drone strikes trigger sharp spikes in civilian mobility and communication—disruptions on a scale comparable to major natural disasters—even when no civilians are physically harmed. Our guests unpack what these findings mean for the strategic logic of precision airpower and discuss the tension between tactical accuracy and perceived legitimacy on the ground. The article is here: Estimating the Impact of Drone Strikes on Civilians Using Call Detail Records Dr. Aidan Milliff is an assistant professor of political science at The Ohio State University. His research examines how people interpret and respond to political violence. Aidan earned his PhD from MIT, where he was a member of the Security Studies Program. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Lushenko, PhD, is a globally recognized expert on artificial intelligence, autonomy, drones, and counter-drone warfare and currently serves as Chief Strategist for the U.S. military’s counter-drone efforts. He is retiring from the U.S. Army after more than two decades of leadership, including extensive service in Special Operations Forces, and is the author of four books and dozens of peer-reviewed articles. His work as both a scholar and practitioner has helped shape the international debate on emerging technologies, autonomy, drones, and the future of warfare. Alisa Laufer hosts this episode with Alexandra Chinchilla. Please reach out to the Irregular Warfare Podcast team with any questions about the episode or the broader mission of the show. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources. All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa
#163
August 18 · 1 hr 12 min
The Future of War Part IV: Special Operations on a Global Battlefield
This episode of the Irregular Warfare Podcast concludes our four-part Future of War series, pairing author and futurist August Cole with senior special operations leaders to explore how tomorrow’s conflicts may unfold. Today’s episode centers on Operation Lightning, a near-future story by P.W. Singer and August Cole that imagines Army Rangers operating across a truly global battlefield. Set during a large-scale conflict with China in 2039, the story follows a four-person Ranger reconnaissance element infiltrating a Chinese space facility in Antarctica. Rather than destroy the facility, the Rangers covertly corrupt its surveillance data, blinding Chinese sensors and creating an opening for a Ranger task force thousands of miles away to seize a critical airfield in the Indo-Pacific. Joining the discussion are Lieutenant General Gil Ferguson, Commanding General of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), and Command Sergeant Major David Waldo, USASOC’s senior enlisted leader. Together with Cole, they examine how Army Special Operations Forces can contribute to the joint force during large-scale combat—and how small, distributed teams can create strategic effects across theaters and domains. At the conclusion of the episode, listeners will hear a professionally narrated reading of Operation Lightning, bringing to life one possible vision of Army Special Operations Forces in the conflicts of the late 2030s. Ben Jebb is the host for this episode. Please reach out to Ben a with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.
#162
August 11 · 59 min
From Subversion to Resistance: Lessons from Russia’s War in Ukraine
Today’s episode examines how Russian agents and local militants exploited ambiguity, weak state capacity, and fragmented local authority to transform unrest in the Donbas into an armed insurgency in 2014. At its core, it is a story about how a small group of armed actors can seize a city—and how local institutions, political legitimacy, and civil society can stop them. Dr. Celeste Wallander and Dr. Serhiy Kudelia are the guests. Summary Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, but the war began eight years earlier with the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of conflict in the Donbas. Wallander and Kudelia trace how Russian operatives converted genuine but diffuse political discontent into an armed insurgency, why militants seized some cities but failed in others, and how confusion over how to respond gave militants time to consolidate control. Their discussion traces Ukraine’s transformation from a state hampered in 2014 by fractured ties between Kyiv and local administrators and unprepared security forces to one capable of mounting a determined resistance to Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022—a transformation enabled by stronger military capacity, municipal leadership, democratic legitimacy, and civil society. They also revisit the debate over US military assistance, the Minsk process, and what outside partners can realistically accomplish when crises escalate faster than relationships, training, and logistics can be built. Dr. Celeste A. Wallander is the executive director of Penn Washington, the University of Pennsylvania’s program in Washington, D.C. From 2022 to 2025, she served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. She previously served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia and Central Asia on the National Security Council from 2013 to 2017 and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia from 2009 to 2012. She has also served as president and CEO of the U.S.-Russia Foundation and held positions at American University, Georgetown University, Harvard University, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Serhiy Kudelia is a professor of political science at Baylor University. His research focuses on the onset and dynamics of insurgencies and civil wars, political regimes and regime change, and political institutions, with a geographic emphasis on Ukraine, Russia, and the former Soviet Union. He is the author of Seize the City, Undo the State: The Inception of Russia’s War on Ukraine (Oxford University Press, 2025), a micro-level study based on more than one hundred interviews with participants and observers of the conflict. The book conducts a meticulous comparison of mobilization dynamics in over a dozen towns of Donbas as well as in two major cities outside of it: Kharkiv and Odesa. It examines how Russian intervention, local elites, militants, municipal officials, and civic resistance produced sharply different outcomes. The book received the American Association for Ukrainian Studies’ 2026 Book Prize. Alexandra Chinchilla is the host for this episode. Please reach out to her with any questions about the episode or IWI. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources. All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa
#161
July 28 · 1 hr 1 min
Five Years After the Withdrawal: Insights from the Afghanistan War Commission
Ahead of the fifth anniversary of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan this August, Dr. Colin Jackson and Colonel (Ret.) E.J. Degen join us to discuss initial insights from the Afghanistan War Commission’s work. The Afghanistan War Commission is an independent body established by the U.S. Congress to examine the key strategic, diplomatic, and operational decisions that pertain to the war in Afghanistan from June 2001 to August 2021. In particular, the episode examines what the US war in Afghanistan can teach us about the promise—and limits—of building partner armies. Summary Security force assistance was central to the US war in Afghanistan. It was the presumed exit strategy: if Afghan forces could become capable enough, the United States could reduce or end its own combat role. Yet the collapse of Afghan security forces after the final US withdrawal raises hard questions about what the United States built, why it built it, and whether the desired end state was ever realistic. The guests discuss the work of the Afghanistan War Commission and what the commission has learned thus far about US efforts to build Afghan security forces. Dr. Colin F. Jackson is the Co-Chair of the Afghanistan War Commission. He has served in a number of roles across academia and policy. Previously he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia from 2017 to 2019. He also served as the senior Department of Defense representative to the U.S.–Taliban peace talks. His career serving in the U.S. Army and U.S. Army Reserve included a deployment to Afghanistan in 2011 as Executive Officer for Policy Planning for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and as a senior civilian advisor to Task Force Mountain Warrior. COL (Ret.) Edmund J. “E.J.” Degen is the Executive Officer and Chief of the Military Operations & Security Forces Assistance Team at the Afghanistan War Commission. He is a retired career U.S. Army field artillery officer who rose to the rank of colonel and most recently served as the director of the Chief of Staff, Army’s Operation Enduring Freedom Study Group. He commanded artillery units at all levels through the brigade and served as the V Corps (U.S.) chief of plans for the Iraq invasion at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, chief of future operations for U.S. Forces Korea, and chief of staff for Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 in Afghanistan. He has coauthored two official U.S. Army histories; Modern War in an Ancient Land: The U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 2001-2014, and On Point, The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Alexandra Chinchilla and Kyle Atwell are the hosts for this episode. Please reach out to them with any questions about the episode or IWI. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources. All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa
#160
July 21 · 50 min
Innovation Under Fire: What WWII’s Commandos Teach Us About War and the Future of Special Operations
Description Episode 160 examines the origins of Britain’s World War II commandos and the enduring role of special operations forces from Churchill’s era to today. Summary This episode explores the creation of Britain’s legendary commando force following the military disasters of 1940. Author Monty Halls and retired Lieutenant General Scott Howell trace how a remote house in the Scottish Highlands became the laboratory for a new kind of warrior – one selected for grit, initiative, adaptability, and the ability to operate independently under extreme pressure. The conversation examines how early commando raids sought to restore British morale, create uncertainty in the German high command, divert enemy forces, and achieve strategic effects disproportionate to the number of troops involved. The discussion then connects these experiences to modern special operations forces, including their relationship with the conventional military, the importance of joint and combined operations, the risks of overrelying on raids as an easy policy option, and the challenge of adapting SOF for cyber, space, drones, and future large-scale conflicts. Throughout, the episode asks how military institutions can protect their mavericks, preserve disciplined initiative, and innovate before battlefield failure forces them to change. Takeaways Britain created its commando force after conventional doctrine and military institutions failed to meet the crisis of 1940. Inverailort House became an experimental training ground where unconventional leaders developed the culture and methods of the early commandos. Small special operations units can create strategic effects by disrupting adversaries, creating uncertainty, diverting forces, and influencing political decision-making. The psychological impact of commando raids often exceeded their immediate tactical results. Early raids frequently failed, demonstrating that courage and audacity cannot substitute for intelligence, training, planning, and joint support. Special operations forces are most effective when their missions support a broader military and political strategy rather than becoming the strategy themselves. The characteristics sought in World War II commandos – grit, initiative, adaptability, discipline, and comfort with uncertainty – remain central to SOF selection today. Unconventional thinking does not mean abandoning standards, accountability, or good order and discipline. Decentralized special operations require exceptional junior leaders who can exercise independent judgment without losing sight of strategic objectives or ethical boundaries. SOF organizations need political and bureaucratic advocates who can protect experimentation, secure resources, and connect unconventional forces to senior decision-makers. Modern special operations forces must maintain close ties with the conventional services and be prepared to enable the broader joint force in large-scale conflict. Future operators will need to integrate traditional military skills with cyber, space, drones, influence activities, intelligence capabilities, and rapidly changing technology. Success can make military organizations resistant to change, so leaders should deliberately build forces and concepts capable of making today’s successful models obsolete. Policymakers should understand what special operations forces can and cannot accomplish and avoid treating them as an inexpensive solution to every strategic problem. Military institutions should protect their mavericks, encourage disciplined experimentation, and adapt before the cost of failure is paid in blood. Lieutenant General Scott Howell is a retired U.S. Air Force officer who served as the Commanding General of Joint Special Operations Command the the Vice Commander of US Special Operations Command. His experience includes senior leadership in Air Force special operations and extensive work with joint and allied special operations forces. Monty Halls is the author of Churchill’s Killing House: The Origins of World War II’s Legendary Commando Fighting Force. A former Royal Marine, he has worked with members of the British and allied special operations communities and has written extensively about the history and modern role of the Royal Marines and commandos. Kyle Atwell is the host for episode 160. Please reach out to him with any questions about the episode or IWI. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources. All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa Photo: Cover image generated using AI-assisted digital art tools.
#159
July 7 · 56 min
From NATO to the Gulf: Allies, Access, and the Hidden Architecture of American Power
Description Episode 159 examines the relationship between alliances, military access, and U.S. global power projection. Summary This episode explores an often overlooked benefit of alliances: wartime access. Dr. Rachel Metz and Ambassador Douglas Lute explain why public debates about allies often focus narrowly on defense spending, while missing the basing, overflight, logistics, intelligence, and political permissions that make U.S. global power possible. The conversation examines how allies and partners enable American military reach, why states may grant, restrict, or deny access, and how domestic politics, retaliation risks, technological change, and shifting global power dynamics can make access harder to secure in future crises. The discussion also considers recent examples from NATO, the Persian Gulf, and Ukraine to show why access is not automatic, why it is a burden allies often bear, and why the United States may need to rethink how it plans, consults, and sustains its alliance relationships. Takeaways Alliances are often judged by burden sharing, but access may be one of their most important strategic benefits. Access includes permission to operate from another state’s land, ports, airspace, territorial waters, or infrastructure. Wartime access allows the United States to project power far from home and sustain operations over time. Allied access helps mitigate the “tyranny of distance” and makes distant theaters militarily reachable. The United States often takes access for granted, but allies and partners can grant, restrict, or deny it. Domestic politics can shape whether a state allows U.S. forces to operate from its territory. Lack of consultation can make allies less willing to support U.S. military operations, especially in wars they view as optional or offensive. Access itself can be a form of burden sharing, because host nations may absorb political, economic, and military risks. Drones, missiles, cyberattacks, sabotage, and other emerging technologies and asymmetric threats may make hosting U.S. forces more costly for allies and partners. Planners should “play green” in exercises and wargames rather than assuming allied access will always be available. U.S. alliances remain a major geostrategic advantage over Russia and China, but that advantage requires active investment and consultation. Ambassador Douglas Lute served as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2013 to 2017. A retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General, he served in senior national security roles across multiple administrations. He is a co-signer of a joint statement by 16 U.S. Ambassadors to NATO and Supreme Allied Commanders titled, “NATO is Vital to U.S. National Security.” Dr. Rachel Metz is an Assistant Professor at The George Washington University. She wrote the article this episode focuses on: “Allies and Access: Implications of an American Turn Away from Alliances,” coauthored with Austin Carson and Paul Poast. Her work examines alliances, military cooperation, wartime access, and the conditions under which states allow foreign militaries to operate from their territory. Kyle Atwell is the host for episode 159. Please reach out to him with any questions about the episode or IWI. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources. All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa Photo: Cover image generated using AI-assisted digital art tools.
#158
June 23 · 52 min
The Wars Nuclear Weapons Don't Prevent
Nuclear weapons may make direct war between major powers less likely, but they do not end competition. Instead, they push states toward indirect forms of conflict: proxy warfare, security force assistance, covert action, and cyber operations. The guests discuss why indirect conflict is so attractive in an era of nuclear risk, how this logic applies to Ukraine and Taiwan, and what it means for US-China competition. They also consider whether the United States is adequately preparing for the kinds of conflicts it is most likely to face: not large-scale conventional wars, but persistent competition through indirect conflict. The academic foundation for the episode is the following article: Kyle Atwell and David Logan (2026), “Shadow Wars in the Shadow of the Bomb: The Link Between Nuclear Weapons and Indirect Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution. General Richard D. Clarke, US Army, retired, served as the twelfth commander of US Special Operations Command. He previously served as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, commandant of cadets at West Point, and director of operations at Joint Special Operations Command. Dr. David Logan is an assistant professor in security studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His research focuses on nuclear weapons, arms control, deterrence, and the US-China security relationship. Dr. Kyle Atwell is an Army Special Forces officer and co-founder and chair of the board of the Irregular Warfare Initiative. He is a former assistant professor at West Point and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Alexandra Chinchilla is the host for this episode. Please reach out to her with any questions about the episode or IWI. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources. All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa
#157
June 9 · 56 min
Setting Out to Win: Why America Needs to Get Serious About Irregular Warfare
This episode examines why the United States has failed at irregular warfare and what it would take to reverse that trajectory—not merely to deter, but to actually win. Summary While irregular warfare is on the rise around the globe today, the United States has largely failed at irregular warfare over the past 75 years. Key issues our guests identify include a military oriented for conventional war, inconsistent knowledge and education about irregular warfare, as well as the lack of a dedicated US government organization that can increase interagency cooperation along with a focus on preparing the operational environment. The guests discuss the resilience and resistance model as a way of thinking about politics, with every state having some element of both resistance and resilience. Understanding these tensions within states reveals opportunities for US foreign policy to work with partners and undermine adversaries. Finally, the episode closes with a discussion of irregular warfare in deterrence and competition. Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles T. Cleveland is a native of Arizona and a 1978 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. His military career included distinguished assignments, most notably Commander, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (Task Force Viking), Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as Commanding General of Special Operations Command Central, before culminating as the three-star Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command from 2012-2015. In that position, he led the overhaul of U.S. Army Special Operations, which improved the effectiveness and training levels of existing units, built needed capability, and improved relationships within the Army, across other government agencies, in Congress, and among international Special Operations Forces partners. Dr. Rob Burrell is a Senior Research Fellow with Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida. From 2020-2024, he taught irregular warfare at Joint Special Operations University. He is a retired Marine and has a PhD in history from the University of Warwick. A prominent expert on resistance and resilience, he is the lead author of the first textbook on irregular warfare Resilience and Resistance: Interdisciplinary Lessons in Competition, Deterrence, and Irregular Warfare (Joint Special Operations University Press 2025) which forms the basis for today’s episode. Alexandra Chinchilla and Kyle Atwell are the hosts for episode 157. Please reach out to them with any questions about the episode or IWI. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources. All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa
#157
June 2 · 48 min
Iran, Ukraine, and the Future of Naval Warfare
Description Episode 156 examines what the U.S.-Iran War and Russia-Ukraine War reveal about how weaker states and irregular actors contest navies, maritime commerce, and global energy flows. Summary This conversation examines naval irregular warfare in an era of drones, shadow fleets, contested chokepoints, and attacks on commercial shipping. The guests explore why the maritime domain is attractive to weaker states and irregular actors, comparing Iran’s approach in the Strait of Hormuz, Ukraine’s campaign in the Black Sea, and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. They also discuss ghost fleets, sanctions enforcement, and the risks of mixing warfighting, law enforcement, and freedom of navigation. Throughout, they emphasize that technology matters most when paired with ingenuity, strategy, and a clear end state. Takeaways Naval irregular warfare is not new; mines, small boats, commerce raiding, deception, and coastal attacks have long been part of maritime competition. Unmanned systems, cheap sensors, long-range fires, spoofing, and commercial data add new layers to older maritime threats. The maritime domain is attractive to irregular actors because trade, energy, food, communications, ports, and undersea infrastructure are difficult to defend and easy to disrupt. Commercial shipping can be as strategically important as naval forces because disrupting trade can create economic and political effects far beyond the immediate battlefield. Chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal allow relatively small actions to generate disproportionate global consequences. Ukraine’s Black Sea campaign shows that a state without a conventional surface fleet can still contest the sea by integrating drones, missiles, intelligence, targeting, and adaptation. Iran’s maritime strategy relies on asymmetric tools such as small boats, mines, drones, dark shipping, proxy-enabled experimentation, and the threat of disruption in confined waters. Ghost fleets, spoofed vessel tracking, reflagging, sanctions evasion, and maritime interdiction create hard legal and operational problems for the United States and its allies. Boarding suspect vessels is not enough; policymakers need a clear legal basis, a clear “then what,” and a strategy that does not undermine freedom of navigation. U.S. and allied navies need to focus on threat tactics as much as threat technologies, especially the combined use of drones, missiles, mines, small boats, and commercial vessels. Platform flexibility, modularity, amphibious capacity, and agile force design may matter as much as any single new technology or class of unmanned system. Tactical success does not equal strategic success. Shooting down drones or destroying vessels matters only if it helps keep seas open and achieves the larger political objective. Dr. Ben Connable is the Executive Director of the Battle Research Group, an Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, and an on-call principal research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses. A retired Marine Corps intelligence and Middle East foreign area officer, he previously served as a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and is the author of Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myths of Modern War. Dr. Ian M. Ralby is president of Auxilium Worldwide and founder and CEO of I.R. Consilium. He is a leading expert on maritime law, maritime security, ocean governance, maritime domain awareness, hybrid aggression, lawfare, and the protection of critical maritime infrastructure. His work supports governments and international organizations confronting piracy, trafficking, smuggling, sanctions evasion, and other maritime security challenges. Kyle Atwell and Alisa Laufer are the hosts for episode 156. Please reach out to them with any questions about the episode or IWI. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources. All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa Photo: AI-generated photo illustration created for the Irregular Warfare Podcast. The image is illustrative and does not depict an actual event, vessel, or operation.
#156
May 20 · 52 min
Hellscape Taiwan: Drones, Deterrence, and the Future of Asymmetric Defense
This week’s episode of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines how Taiwan could deter—or potentially defeat—a Chinese invasion by transforming the Taiwan Strait into an “unmanned hellscape.” Anchored in the recent CNAS report Hellscape for Taiwan: Rethinking Asymmetric Defense, the conversation explores how drones, autonomous systems, and mobile defenses are reshaping warfare in the Indo-Pacific. Drawing from lessons in Ukraine, the guests argue that cheap, expendable drones offer Taiwan a way to strengthen its longstanding “porcupine strategy” by imposing massive costs on a PLA invasion force during the dangerous amphibious crossing of the Taiwan Strait. The episode also explores how Taiwan’s geography favors the defender if leveraged correctly. Narrow beaches, mountainous terrain, dense urban areas, and the roughly 100-mile Strait create opportunities for a layered defense built around mines, kamikaze drones, mobile air defenses, and uncrewed maritime systems. At the same time, the guests assess the political and organizational barriers Taiwan faces in implementing a truly asymmetric strategy, arguing that the island’s security may depend less on high-end prestige platforms and more on building a resilient and scalable ecosystem of autonomous systems capable of making invasion prohibitively costly. Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he directs work on cyber, emerging technologies, and Indo-Pacific security. A former PACOM J3 and carrier strike group commander, RADM Montgomery has extensive experience working on Taiwan defense issues and regularly conducts engagements with Taiwanese military officials. Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn is a senior fellow and director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). A leading expert on defense strategy, drones, and emerging technologies, she is the co-author of Hellscape for Taiwan: Rethinking Asymmetric Defense, which serves as the foundation for today’s discussion. Ben Jebb is the host for this episode. Please reach out to Ben with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.
#155
May 8 · 50 min
The Counterinsurgency Dilemma: Foreign Fighter Influence on Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Somalia
Episode 154 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines a core puzzle in intrastate conflict: how a small number of foreign fighters can exert outsized influence on insurgencies. Anchored in Professor Tricia Bacon’s The Counterinsurgency Dilemma, this episode explores when foreign fighters strengthen insurgent groups—and when they undermine them. While foreign fighters are often associated with higher levels of violence, they typically make up only a small share of insurgent forces. As Bacon argues, this reveals a key insight: local insurgents—not foreign fighters—drive outcomes. They control strategy, resources, and relationships with the population, making them the decisive actors in any insurgency. Foreign fighters can still provide meaningful advantages. They bring combat experience, specialized skills, and sometimes external funding. Their high risk tolerance and ideological commitment can make groups more aggressive and tactically capable. In fragmented insurgencies, they can even shift the balance of power among rival factions. However, these benefits come with serious costs. Foreign fighters often lack cultural understanding and local legitimacy, and their preference for extreme violence can alienate civilian populations. Over time, this can strain relationships within insurgent movements, reduce local recruitment, and erode long-term effectiveness. Drawing on his experience as U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, Steven Schwartz highlights how groups like al-Shabaab evolved from foreign-influenced networks into locally driven organizations. Their durability, he notes, stems less from popular support than from their ability to impose predictable order—often outperforming weak governance alternatives. Ultimately, the episode reframes foreign fighters as a diagnostic tool rather than the central problem. High levels of foreign fighter influence often signal a weak insurgent group, while limited influence suggests a stronger, locally embedded movement. For practitioners, this distinction matters: effective counterinsurgency must focus on the local dynamics that sustain insurgencies—not just the foreign fighters who draw attention.
#154
April 24 · 51 min
Where the Lion Can’t Reach: Unconventional Warfare in Major War
Description Episode 153 examines the role of unconventional warfare and special operations forces in conventional major war. Summary This conversation explores how unconventional warfare can support, shape, and sometimes substitute for conventional military operations in large-scale combat. Our guests examine what unconventional warfare is, why it matters beyond the special operations community, and how support to resistance forces can create strategic and operational effects for joint force commanders. The discussion draws heavily on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, where U.S. Special Forces partnered with Kurdish Peshmerga forces to create a northern front, tie down Iraqi forces, generate intelligence, and support the broader conventional campaign. The episode also examines the limits and risks of unconventional warfare, including partner alignment, feasibility assessments, political constraints, and the need for policymakers and commanders to understand both the value and the limitations of this tool. Takeaways Unconventional warfare is best understood in simple terms as support to resistance movements or insurgencies. Unconventional warfare is not just a SOF issue; conventional joint force commanders and civilian policymakers need to understand how it can support broader campaigns. UW can supplement conventional forces by shaping the battlefield, imposing costs, generating intelligence, and creating dilemmas for the enemy. UW can also substitute for conventional forces when geography, politics, or access prevent a conventional formation from operating in a particular area. The 2003 invasion of Iraq provides a powerful example of UW supporting a conventional campaign, as a small number of U.S. SOF personnel helped mobilize Kurdish Peshmerga forces to create pressure in the north. Working with local forces is not the same as replacing U.S. infantry with indigenous infantry; resistance forces have their own strengths, limits, interests, and operating areas. Successful UW depends on feasibility: competent local leadership, survivable terrain, contested space, political conditions, and at least some alignment of objectives. Interest alignment is rarely perfect, but major divergence between U.S. objectives and partner objectives can create serious strategic risk. Relationships matter. Long-term credibility, prior engagement, and trust can make UW options more viable when crises emerge. Policymakers should not assume UW can be created instantly in a crisis; the best options often require years of preparation, relationships, infrastructure, and understanding. SOF practitioners need to explain UW in terms conventional commanders care about: operational effects, risk, timing, authorities, and contribution to the broader campaign. Special Forces must remain excellent at working by, with, and through partners—not just at unilateral tactical tasks. Lieutenant General (Retired) Ken Tovo served as the commanding general of U.S. Army Special Operations Command. A career Special Forces officer, he commanded at multiple levels and has extensive experience in special operations, unconventional warfare, and irregular warfare. He is currently the president and CEO of DOL Enterprises, Chairman of the Green Beret Foundation, and a senior partner at National Security Capital Partners. Mark Grdovic is the author of Those Who Face Death: The Untold Story of Special Forces and the Iraqi Kurdish Resistance. He served as a battalion operations officer during the 2003 invasion of Iraq while working alongside Kurdish resistance forces in northern Iraq. After retiring from the Army, he has continued to support the special operations community, including work with SOCCENT and USSOCOM. Kyle Atwell and Alexandra Chinchilla are the hosts for episode 153. Please reach out to them with any questions about the episode or IWI. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources. All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa Photo: Cover image is a personal photo provided by one of the podcast guests.
#153
April 17 · 1 hr 1 min
What the Hell is Irregular Warfare Anyway?
Episode 152 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast grapples with the many definitions of irregular warfare used across the community of interest. In this episode, our guests discuss why the concept of irregular warfare has resisted a stable definition across decades of changing doctrine, and what that persistent confusion has cost operationally and strategically. We walk through three competing definitional approaches— the maximal, the traditional, and the competition-disruption model — weighing the strengths and weaknesses of each. We close by asking what irregular warfare actually is at its core, and why getting that answer right matters, not just for writers of doctrine, but for practitioners. The article is here: Fragmented Frontiers: Three Approaches to Understanding Irregular Warfare Dr. Chris Tripodi is Reader in Irregular Warfare at the Defence Studies Department, King's College London. His research focuses on the forms of knowledge Western militaries use to understand their operational environments, and the complex relationship between counterinsurgency theory and practice. Eric Robinson is an Associate Director of the Data Science and Technology Group at the RAND Corporation, where his research focuses on special operations, irregular warfare, and gray zone challenges. He is the lead author of RAND's 2023 report Strategic Disruption by Special Operations Forces, which we touch on in today’s episode. Lieutenant General (ret.) Mike Nagata served for 38 years in the US Army, with 34 years in special operations. Among his many positions of leadership, he served as Commander of US Special Operations Command-Central from 2013 to 2015, and was heavily involved in the first two years of combat operations against the Islamic State. Alisa Laufer hosts this episode. Please reach out to the Irregular Warfare Podcast team with any questions about the episode or the broader mission of the show. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources. All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa
#152
April 3 · 58 min
Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare
Episode 151 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast explores how the United States wields power not only through military force, but through dollars, sanctions, export controls, and supply chains. Anchored in Eddie Fishman’s book Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare, this episode examines the rise of economic statecraft as a central feature of great power competition. Drawing on the firsthand experiences of former Treasury Secretary Jack Lew and former Deputy National Security Advisor Daleep Singh, the conversation unpacks key concepts such as dollar dominance, sanctions design, and the hidden “chokepoints” embedded within global finance and technology that give the United States asymmetric leverage. Through case studies on Iran, Russia, and China, the guests assess both the power and the limits of economic warfare. Sanctions can bring adversaries to the negotiating table—but only when aligned with clear political objectives, coalition support, and careful calibration to avoid self-inflicted harm. In the strategic competition with China, export controls on foundational technologies reflect a shift from coercing behavior to preserving relative advantage. The episode ultimately argues that economic tools must be treated with the same rigor as military force: grounded in legitimacy, disciplined in execution, and guided by a coherent doctrine for an era of geo-economic rivalry.
#151
March 20 · 51 min
From Orbit to Objective: Space and the Future of Conflict
Space is no longer a silent backdrop to conflict—it is a contested domain that enables, shapes, and increasingly defines how wars are fought. In this episode, Ben Jebb and Charlie McGillis sit down with Dr. James Kiras and General Stephen Whiting to examine the strategic importance of space in both great power competition and irregular warfare. The discussion explores how modern military operations rely on space-based capabilities for precision, synchronization, intelligence, and global reach—and what happens when those capabilities are contested. The conversation also dives into the evolving “SOF-space-cyber triad,” highlighting how special operations forces, space professionals, and cyber operators can integrate to create complex dilemmas for adversaries. From maneuver warfare in orbit to countering Chinese influence campaigns in the Global South, the episode underscores a critical takeaway: space superiority is not automatic. It must be defended, integrated, and deliberately incorporated into joint campaigning if the United States and its partners are to preserve their strategic advantage. Dr. James Kiras is Professor of Strategy at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at Air University. A leading scholar on special operations and irregular warfare, his research focuses on strategy, special operations theory, and the integration of emerging domains into modern conflict. General Stephen N. Whiting is the Commander of United States Space Command, where he leads joint forces responsible for military operations in the space domain. A career Air Force officer with extensive experience in space operations and national security strategy, he oversees efforts to defend U.S. and allied interests in an increasingly contested and competitive space environment. Ben Jebb and Charlie McGillis are the hosts for this episode. Please reach out to Ben and Charlie with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.
#150
March 13 · 39 min
Iran, Revolution, and the Logic of Proxy Warfare
Episode 150 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines the historical and strategic forces that shaped modern Iran and explores how the Islamic Republic uses irregular warfare to advance its interests in the Middle East. Our guests begin by examining the political foundations of modern Iranian politics, tracing the country’s trajectory from the rule of the Shah and the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh to the revolutionary upheaval of 1979. They then explore why the Islamic Republic turned to irregular warfare—particularly the use of proxy groups and militant networks—as a core component of its foreign policy and regional strategy. Finally, our guests assess how Iran’s proxy network evolved over time, why it proved effective for decades, and what recent conflicts may reveal about the future of Iran’s regional influence and internal political stability. Dr. Arman Mahmoudian is a research fellow at the Global and National Security Institute and an adjunct faculty member whose work focuses on Middle Eastern and Russian affairs. His research and commentary have appeared in outlets including Foreign Policy, The National Interest, and the Atlantic Council, and he frequently provides expert analysis for international media. Behnam Ben Taleblu is senior director of the Iran Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he specializes in Iranian security and political issues including nuclear proliferation, missile development, sanctions, and the Islamic Republic’s regional proxy network. Ben Jebb and Alex Chinchilla are the hosts for this episode. Please reach out to Ben and Alex with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.
#149
March 6 · 56 min
The Strategic Logic of Large Militant Alliance Networks
Episode 148 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast explores why militant groups form alliances, and what the content of those alliances can tell us about their organizational capacity. Drawing on an article Professor Chris Blair co-authored with Phillip Potter, The Strategic Logic of Large Militant Alliance Networks, this episode offers a new framework for understanding militant cooperation. Reflective of the comparative advantage model, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State each pursued alliance networks not simply from a position of strength, but to compensate for distinct organizational deficits–with al-Qaeda seeking operational reach after 9/11, and the Islamic State seeking ideological legitimacy after its split with al-Qaeda. The conversation explores how these dynamics played out with these two groups and how practitioners might use these insights to efficiently disrupt militant alliances in an era increasingly focused on great power competition. Dr. Chris Blair is an Assistant Professor at Princeton University in the Department of Politics. Professor Blair’s research mainly engages with questions of how counterinsurgency policies affect civilian and rebel behavior and how prospective host countries respond to forcibly displaced people. He has published prolifically in top academic journals as well as publications such as Foreign Affairs and the Washington Post. General Joseph Votel is the current distinguished chair of West Point’s Combatting Terrorism Center. He is a retired Army 4-star officer who in his last active duty assignment served as the commanding general of U.S. Central Command. During his 39 years in the military he commanded Special Operations and conventional military forces at every level. Alisa Laufer hosts this episode. Please reach out to the Irregular Warfare Podcast team with any questions about the episode or the broader mission of the show. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.
#148
February 20 · 1 hr 1 min
Preserving the American Edge: Revitalizing the Defense Industrial Base
Episode 147 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines the past, present, and future of America’s defense industrial base—and why its strength may determine the outcome of the next era of great power competition. Drawing on historical experience and contemporary reforms, the episode argues that American military advantage has long depended on close collaboration between government and industry. From Roosevelt’s wartime mobilization to Cold War breakthroughs in stealth and reconnaissance, U.S. success has repeatedly flowed from its ability to harness commercial innovation and industrial scale. Today, however, that ecosystem faces mounting strain as China expands its manufacturing capacity and defense production at unprecedented speed. The conversation highlights a central tension: while the United States retains unmatched technological depth—especially in commercial sectors such as artificial intelligence and advanced computing—much of that innovation remains only partially integrated into defense. Regulatory barriers, acquisition culture, and post–Cold War consolidation have narrowed the defense industrial base, limiting the military’s ability to tap the full breadth of American industry. In response, the U.S. Army is experimenting with faster acquisition cycles, commercial partnerships, and modular, software-driven designs that shorten timelines from concept to fielding while preserving the ability to scale production in a crisis. Finally, the discussion addresses the policy implications of rebuilding industrial strength. Sustained investment, clearer demand signals to industry, and greater flexibility in budgeting and contracting are essential to restoring surge capacity and critical stockpiles. The guests emphasize that the costs of preparation are far lower than the costs of deterrence failure. For practitioners and policymakers alike, the episode highlights a simple but urgent message: preserving America’s military edge requires aligning industrial policy, acquisition reform, and technological innovation with the realities of renewed great power competition. Dr. Alexander Miller is the Senior Advisor for Science and Technology and Chief Technology Officer to the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. He holds a Master’s degree in Systems Engineering from Johns Hopkins University and a Doctorate of Technology from Purdue University’s Polytechnic Institute. Dr. Seth G. Jones is president of the Defense and Security Department and Harold Brown Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His work focuses on defense strategy, the defense industrial base, and irregular warfare. His book The American Edge: The Military Tech Nexus and the Sources of Great Power Dominance anchors this episode’s discussion. Ben Jebb and Kyle Atwell host this episode. Please reach out to the Irregular Warfare Podcast team with any questions about the episode or the broader mission of the show. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.
#146
February 6 · 55 min
Competitive Intervention, Proxy War, and Military Assistance: Anderson, Eyre, and Kuhlman
Description: Episode 146 examines the impact of external military assistance on civil wars. Summary This conversation delves into the complexities of competitive intervention in civil wars, exploring the types of military aid provided, how external support influences conflict dynamics, and implications for practitioners and policymakers. The discussion highlights the prevalence of external interventions, the escalation dynamics involved, and the moral dilemmas faced by intervening states. Our guests emphasize the need for a nuanced understanding of these interventions, particularly in the context of an increasingly multipolar world where we anticipate competitive intervention and proxy wars will increase. Takeaways Competitive intervention is characterized by opposing military assistance from different states. 75% of civil wars since WWII have experienced external military assistance. This is very common. Weapons transfers are the most common form of external support in conflicts. External aid significantly impacts the duration and dynamics of civil wars. Competitive interventions are associated with a 50% decline in the likelihood of conflict termination. Ethnic dynamics can complicate civil war outcomes but do not universally determine conflict duration. Non-state actors are increasingly involved in providing support in civil conflicts. The rise of multipolarity may lead to increased competitive interventions. Escalation dynamics complicate the nature of military support in conflicts. Specifically escalation concerns will lead donors to give enough support to keep the conflict going, but not enough to enable a decisive victory. Policymakers should consider the moral implications of prolonging conflicts through intervention. Future conflicts will require a diverse range of military capabilities and strategies. General (retired) Wayne Eyre served as Chief of the Defence Staff in the Canadian Armed Forces from 2021 to 2024, Canada’s highest-ranking military officer. With more than 40 years of service, he commanded at multiple levels, including operational deployments in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He is currently a Senior Fellow and Visiting Professor at the University of Ottawa. Dr. Noel Anderson is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto and author of Wars Without End: Competitive Intervention, Escalation Control, and Protracted Conflict. The book examines why contemporary wars so often resist clear endings. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Lieutenant Colonel (Dr.) Matthew Kuhlman is a U.S. Army officer, military scholar, and the current Managing Editor at the Irregular Warfare Initiative – where he helps curate written practitioner and scholar insights for the irregular warfare community. Kyle Atwell is the host for episode 146. Please reach out to him with any questions about the episode or IWI. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources. All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa Photo: Cover image generated using AI-assisted digital art tools.

Showing 1–20 of 24 episodes