Brian Johnson
7 Minute Security is a weekly information security podcast focusing on penetration testing, blue teaming and building a career in security. The podcast also features in-depth interviews with industry leaders who share their insights, tools, tips and tricks for being a successful security engineer.
Hello friends! We're long overdue for a tale of pentest pwnage, and this one is a humdinger! It's actually kind of three tales in one, focusing on pentesting wins using: Manual "open heart surgery" on the root of the Active Directory domain The new totally rad DHCP poisoning module of Responder An opportunity to abuse GPOs with SharpGPOAbuse (P.S. we talked about this tool about a year ago in episode 441)
Today we're joined by Louis Evans of Arctic Wolf to talk about all things cyber insurance, including: History on cyber insurance - who's buying it, what it does and doesn't cover, and when it started to be something you didn't want to leave home without What are insurance companies asking/demanding of customers before writing a cyber insurance policy? What basic things organizations can do to reduce malware/ransomware incidents (whether they are considering a cyber insurance policy or not)? How do I evaluate the various insurance carriers out there and pick a good one?
Hey friends! Today we're going to recap the SIEM/SOC players we've evaluated so far (Arctic Wolf, Elastic, Sumo Logic, Milton Security) and then talk about a new contender that was brought to our attention: Blumira (not a sponsor, but I'm really digging what I'm seeing/hearing/experiencing thus far)!
Today we're talking about Ping Castle (not a sponsor), an awesome tool for enumerating tons of info out of your Active Directory environment and identifying weaknesses, misconfigurations and paths to escalation! It's wonderful for both red and blue teamers. Some of Ping Castle's cool features include being able find: Kerberoastable and ASREPRoastable users Plain text passwords lingering in Group Policy Objects Users with never-expiring passwords Non-supported versions of Windows Machines configured with unconstrained delegation Attack and escalation paths to Domain Admins
Today we continue our series focused on building a security consultancy and talk about: A phishing campaign that went off the rails, and lessons learned from it First impressions of an awesome tool to help add MFA to your Active Directory (not a sponsor) A tangent story about how my wife brought some thieves to justice!
Hey friends! Today I've got some exciting personal/professional news to share: our Light Pentest eBook - which is a practical, step-by-step playbook for internal network penetration testing - is now available for purchase! Note: this eBook and the Light Pentest LITE training are two separate things, but do cover some of the same topics. The Light Pentest eBook covers: Grabbing and analyzing packet captures Abusing insecure network protocols Exploiting (the lack of) SMB signing Capturing, cracking and passing hashes Locating high-value targets with DNS zone transfers Exploiting vulnerable Group Policy Objects Scraping screenshots of Web interfaces with WitnessMe Finding and cracking "Kerberoastable" and "ASREPRoastable" Active Directory accounts Dumping, passing and cracking hashes from domain controllers The Light Pentest eBook is available now for $7.77, and by purchasing it you are entitled to all future editions/revisions going forward.
Today our good buddy Joe Skeen and I virtually sit down with Matt Quammen of Blue Team Alpha to talk about all things incident response! Topics covered include: Top 5 things to do and not do during ransomware event Challenges when responding to ransomware events Opportunities to break into infosec/IR The value of tabletop exercises, and some great ideas for conducting your own Incident response stress and success stories Cyber insurance - worth it or not?
Today our friend Christopher Fielder from Arctic Wolf is back for an interview four-peat! We had a great chat about making sense of vendor alphabet soup terms (like SIEM, SOC, EDR/MDR/XDR, ML, AI and more!), optimizing your SOC to "see" as much as possible, tackling vendor/customer communication problems, and simplifying security product pricing to make purchases less stressful for customers! And don't forget to check out Christopher's first, second and third interviews with 7MS.
Today we're continuing our series called Desperately Seeking a Super SIEM for SMBs - this time with a focus on a new contender in our bake-off: Perch Security! It might help you to go back and take in part 1 and part 2, but today we're focusing on the first experience I had chatting with the sales/technical folks at Perch. TLDL: I really liked a lot of things I was hearing and seeing. Pros (perceived) include: Simple pricing model Easy to use dashboard Cool "marketplace" of integrations you can add to your instance and start getting alerts for Nice API integration that seemed pretty simple to use - and that covers a lot of different cloud products and services Ticket dashboard looked straightfoward to use and interpret Can quickly add IPs/subnets that you don't want to monitor, if appropriate
Today we continue our series we started recently (part 1 is here about finding a super SIEM for SMBs. Specifically I have some updates on (and frustrations with) Arctic Wolf, Elastic, Milton Security and Perch Security. Here's the TLDL version: Arctic Wolf They remain a strong contender in my bake-offs. They also could tick several boxes for an org as they offer continuous internal/external vulnerability scanning as well as a managed SOC. (And yes, I'm probably a tiny bit biased because I know a bunch of AWN's engineers and like the product) Elastic I've loved my interactions with the sales folks and engineers at Elastic. My initial trial had some technical speed bumps (which Elastic helped me remedy). I eventually did get some Elastic agents enrolled on endpoints in my lab. However, now that I'm up and running (and admittedly I should go through the Webinars and online training), I'm feeling overwhelmed. There's a jillion menus and submenus to explore. I feel like I've been given a high-performance sports car but completely lack the knowledge on how to make the most of it. I'll keep Elastic in my back pocket, but I don't think I can feel comfortable handing this dashboard over to a SMB IT/security staff and have them run with it. Milton Security A few weeks ago I had my first ever sales call with this group, and liked a lot of what I heard. They're up front about being a threat-hunt-as-a-service organization and they're not looking to partner with just any customer. The way they bundle sources of data (for the sake of pricing) makes sense to me, and although I haven't seen a formal quote from them yet, I think they will be reasonably priced when compared to some of the "big box" solutions. Perch Security After part 1 of this series, several of you pinged me and said to check out Perch Security. I'm very excited to connect with them but had a tough time getting someone to respond to my inquires (two weeks to be exact). Good news is I've got a call scheduled with them this week and am anxious to share what I learn about Perch on our next episode in this series.
Today we're continuing our discussion on phishing campaigns - including a technical "gotcha" that might redirect your phishing emails into a digital black hole if you're not careful! As I mentioned last week, I've been heavy into spinning up and tearing down phishing campaigns, so I finally got around to documenting everything in episode 481. This week I ran into a bizarre issue where test phishes to myself suddenly disappeared from my Outlook altogether! After chatting with some folks on Slack I did a message trace in the Exchange Admin Center under: Mail flow > Message Trace > Start a trace then make the Sender field be the user you're sending phishing emails from. That showed me that my phishes were being quarantined! To get around the quarantine, I went into Mail flow > Rules and then created a new rule with the following properties: Apply this rule if > The sender's domain is > yourphishingdomain.com Then under Do the following: Set the spam confidence level (SCL) to...Bypass spam filtering Under And, click the drop-down and choose: Modify the message properties...set a message header...X-MS-Exchange-Organization-BypassClutter Then click where it says Enter text and change header value to True and click OK.
Today we're revisiting how to make a kick-butt cred-capturing phishing campaign with Gophish, Amazon Lightsail, LetsEncrypt, ExpiredDomains.net and a special little extra something that makes creating phishing landing pages waaaaaaayyyyyyyyyy easier! For some quicker review, you can check out part 1 and also the complementary YouTube video, but I wanted to revisit this kick-butt process and update a few items: First, this SingleFile extension is amaaaaaaaazing for making phishing landing pages with ease! The process to get GApps to let you generate an app-specific password for using with GoPhish is kinda annoying. The steps below should get you going: After domain registration, log into admin.google.com or click Manage Workspace button at checkout. At the next screen click Workspace Admin Console. Sign in with the person you'll be spoofing from, and the temporary password emailed to your backup email account during checkout. In the search bar search for Less Secure Apps, choose Allow users to manage their access to less secure apps. Now, in the upper right, hit Manage Your Google Account. Under Security, click Protect your account and click Add phone number. Finish that process, then click Continue to your Google account. Back at the main admin page, under Less secure app access, click Turn on access (not recommended). At the next screen click Allow less secure apps: ON Back at the main screen, click 2-Step Verification and set it to On. Back at the main screen again, a new option called App passwords should be there. Click it. Choose to generate a custom name like LOL and then then an app password will appear. Write it down as it only appears once! Finally, a quick reference for getting your LetsEncrypt cert to work with GoPhish. Get your LetsEncrypt cert generated, and then forge a .crt and .key file to use with GoPhish: cp /etc/letsencrypt/live/YOUR-DOMAIN/fullchain.pem ./domain.crt cp /etc/letsencrypt/live/YOUR-DOMAIN/privkey.pem ./domain.key Now go into the GoPhish .json config file and change the cert_path and key_path to the ones you just generated, and change use_tls to TRUE on both places in the config as well.
Today we're talking about the SIEM bake-off for SMBs that we've recently embarked on. We're currently evaluating several solutions - either for customer-facing purposes, internal kick-the-tires fun, or both. Candiates include: Arctic Wolf Elastic Milton Security Protocol46 Sumo Logic First we're starting by running each vendor through a series of questions, then likely following up with a demo where we'll run some technical tests and simulated hacking to see which vendor or vendors reign supreme!
Hey friends, today we're talking about a new security training offering 7MinSec has created called Light Pentest LITE - Live Interactive Training Experience. It's a 3-day course (with each class session being 3 hours long) consisting of live (via Zoom), hands-on, instructor-led sessions that are focused on teaching you how to find, exploit and defend against common Active Directory weaknesses! Check out today's episode to learn more and get a hint for an OSINT exercise that will get you 10% off of a Light Pentest LITE training session!
Hey friends, today we're continuing our discussion of password cracking by sharing some methodology that has helped us get a high cred yield, and some tips on taking cracked passwords from multiple sources and Frankensteining them into a beautiful report for your customer. For some background, when 7MS started as a biz, we used to crack passwords in Paperspace but invested in an on-prem cracking rig a few years ago. That rig has been flipping sweet, but had some heating issues which prompted me to send the system in for warranty and use an awesome cracking rig in AWS in the meantime. Whether you're cracking locally or in the cloud, here's a quick methodology that has cracked many a hash for us: Do a straight-up hashcat crack against the PwnedPasswords list (at time of this writing I don't have a good source for the cracked versions of these passwords. I used to grab them at hashes.org. Anybody got an alternative? Do a straight-up hashcat crack through the RockYou2021 list Run the hatecrack methodology, including the quick crack, the quick crack with rules (I'm partial to OneRuleToRuleThemAll), and brute-forcing all 1-8 character passwords Once I'm ready to wrap up all the cracked passwords and put them in a nice shiny report for the customer, I do the following (using hashcombiner and pipal): # Run hash_combiner on hashcat's pot file and write results to a file python /opt/hc/hash_combiner.py user_hash /opt/hashcat/hashcat.potfile > /tmp/round1.txt # Run hash_combiner on hatecrack's pot file and write results to a file python /opt/hc/hash_combiner.py user_hash /opt/hatecrack/hashcat.pot > /tmp/round2.txt # Cat the two files together into a third file cat /tmp/round1.txt /tmp/round2.txt > /tmp/round3.txt # Sort and de-dupe the third file cat /tmp/round3.txt | sort -uf > /tmp/nice-and-clean.txt # Take just the passwords out of the "nice and clean" output cut -d ':' -f 2 /tmp/nice-and-clean.txt > /tmp/pipal-temp.txt # Score the passwords using pipal /opt/pipal/pipal.rb /tmp/pipal-temp.txt > /tmp/pip-final.txt Now you've got a nice-and-clean.txt list of users and their cracked passwords, as well as the pip-final.txt with deeper analysis of cracked passwords, their commonalities, etc.
Today we're talking about Cobalt Strike for newbs - including how to get it up and running, as well as some tools that will help you generate beacons while evading EDR at the same time! Some helpful things mentioned in today's episode: Wherever you spin up your CS instance, it's probably a good idea to lock down the firewall to only specific IPs. With Digital Ocean, I found this article helpful. When generating CS listeners, the C2Concealer from FortyNorth helped me get malleable C2 profiles generated while creating a LetsEncrypt cert at the same time! My CS beacons kept getting gobbled by AV, but the following resources helped me get some stealthy ones generated: Artifact Kit, PEzor and ScareCrow. Here's a specific ScareCrow example that flew under the EDR radar: Scarecrow -I myrawshellcode.bin -etw -domain www.microsoft.com PowerUpSQL is awesome for finding servers where you can run stored procedures to send your attacking box a priv'd hash to pass/capture/crack. Check out this presentation on PowerUpSQL to find vulnerable targets, then use mssql_ntlm_stealer module in Metasploit to have fun with the account hashes. Be sure to set your domain when configuring the Metasploit module! When trying to pop an SMB shell with relay tools, I've had problems recently with those attempts being stopped by defensive tools. Then I found this gem which talks about tweaking smbexec.py to evade AV. It worked a treat! When you use MultiRelay, I had no idea that it includes an upload function so you can simply upload your beacon.exe from a SYSTEM shell and fire it right from a command line. Cool! Once my beacons started firing around the pentest environment, I temporarily allowed all IPs to talk to my Digital Ocean box - just because the IP I grabbed from a "what is my IP?" Google search didn't always match the actual beacons that called home. Once the beacon connectivity was established, I tweaked the beacon firewall rules to just let certain IPs in the door. This Cobalt Strike Extension Kit was FREAKING sweet for adding "right click > do awesome stuff" functionality to CS like dump hashes, search for Kerberoastable accounts, setup persistence, etc. Got a SYSTEM level shell but need to abuse a DA's privs? Tell the beacon to pull back a list of running processes, then click one (like explorer.exe) running under a DA's account and then impersonate it to add your account to the DA group! Having issues dumping LSASS? This article from Red Canary gives you some great ideas to do it in a way that doesn't make AV throw a fit! Trying to RDP using PtH? This article will help you out. And if you get warnings about not being able to RDP in because of some sort of login restriction, try adjusting this reg key with CME: cme smb 10.1.2.3 -u Administrator -H THE-HASH-YOU-CAPTURED -x 'reg add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /t REG_DWORD /v DisableRestrictedAdmin /d 0x0 /f'
**STOP!** If you didn't listen to [last week's episode](https://7ms.us/7ms-475-tales-of-internal-network-pentest-pwnage-part-27/) you might want to, since this was a two-part tale of pwnage. Either way I'll get you up to speed and talk about why this was (of course) one of my favorite pentests ever.
Yeahhhhhh! Today's another fun tale of pentest pwnage, including: The importance of starting your pentest with an AD account that actually has access to...ya know...stuff The importance of starting your pentest plugged into a network that actually has...you know...systems connected to it! This BHIS article is awesome for finding treasures in SMB shares PowerUpSQL audits are a powerful way to get pwnage on a pentest - check out this presentation for some practical how-to advice IPMI/BMCs often have weak creds and/or auth bypasses so don't forget to check for them. Rapid7 has a slick blog on the topic. Don't forget to check for vulnerable VMWare versions because some of them have major vulnerabilities
Hey friends! Today we're dusting off an old mini-series about password cracking in the cloud (check out part 1 and part 2) and sharing some awesome info on building a monster of a cracking rig in AWS! One reason we haven't talked about password cracking in the cloud in a while is because back in winter of 2019 I built baby's first password cracking. Unfortunately, this week, Hashy (the name I gave to the rig) is overheating, and GPUs are impossible to find, so what's a pentester to do? Well, in today's episode I talk about this article from Sevnx which walks you through building a virtual password-cracking beast in the cloud. The article (complemented by a sweet video) will get you running in short order. WARNING: running this instance is super expensive (the author warns the instance would cost ~$9k/month if you left it run continuously). The steps are pretty straightforward, but between reboots I found that hashcat acted all wonky. Luckily, the article addresses that with this great tip: Pro tip: Save the Cuda download somewhere. If you ever turn your cracker off and get errors running hashcat when you turn it back on, re-run the install line. We think AWS sometimes refreshes the drivers or something and hashcat doesn't like it very much. If you need help installing one of my fave tools, hatecrack check out my password cracking in the cloud gist. Also, our buddy Joe pointed me towards a utility called duplicut to help de-dupe large password-cracking wordlists. Once the AWS instance is setup, what kind of stats do we get out of this demon? Here's the result of hashcat -b: Hashmode: 0 - MD5 Speed.#1.........: 55936.1 MH/s (47.79ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:8 Speed.#2.........: 55771.4 MH/s (47.94ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:8 Speed.#3.........: 55827.0 MH/s (47.88ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:8 Speed.#4.........: 55957.7 MH/s (47.78ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:8 Speed.#*.........: 223.5 GH/s Hashmode: 100 - SHA1 Speed.#1.........: 17830.1 MH/s (75.08ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 17774.0 MH/s (75.21ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 17780.9 MH/s (75.26ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 17795.6 MH/s (75.22ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 71180.6 MH/s Hashmode: 1400 - SHA2-256 Speed.#1.........: 7709.9 MH/s (86.84ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 7718.3 MH/s (86.75ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 7710.4 MH/s (86.75ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 7694.4 MH/s (87.02ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 30833.0 MH/s Hashmode: 1700 - SHA2-512 Speed.#1.........: 2399.8 MH/s (69.70ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 2401.1 MH/s (69.68ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 2397.3 MH/s (69.78ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 2400.3 MH/s (69.70ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 9598.5 MH/s Hashmode: 22000 - WPA-PBKDF2-PMKID+EAPOL (Iterations: 4095) Speed.#1.........: 866.5 kH/s (94.23ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 866.7 kH/s (94.21ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 865.6 kH/s (94.30ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 866.7 kH/s (94.20ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 3465.5 kH/s Hashmode: 1000 - NTLM Speed.#1.........: 102.2 GH/s (26.05ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:8 Speed.#2.........: 102.3 GH/s (26.05ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:8 Speed.#3.........: 102.2 GH/s (26.07ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:8 Speed.#4.........: 102.3 GH/s (26.04ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:8 Speed.#*.........: 409.0 GH/s Hashmode: 3000 - LM Speed.#1.........: 41104.7 MH/s (64.74ms) @ Accel:512 Loops:1024 Thr:64 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 40216.5 MH/s (66.11ms) @ Accel:512 Loops:1024 Thr:64 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 40507.3 MH/s (65.89ms) @ Accel:512 Loops:1024 Thr:64 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 39181.4 MH/s (68.13ms) @ Accel:512 Loops:1024 Thr:64 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 161.0 GH/s Hashmode: 5500 - NetNTLMv1 / NetNTLMv1+ESS Speed.#1.........: 55861.0 MH/s (47.87ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:2 Speed.#2.........: 55864.3 MH/s (47.87ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:2 Speed.#3.........: 55519.4 MH/s (47.98ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:2 Speed.#4.........: 55826.6 MH/s (47.89ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:2 Speed.#*.........: 223.1 GH/s Hashmode: 5600 - NetNTLMv2 Speed.#1.........: 3968.0 MH/s (84.37ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 3968.1 MH/s (84.38ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 3965.6 MH/s (84.38ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 3967.8 MH/s (84.37ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 15869.5 MH/s Hashmode: 1500 - descrypt, DES (Unix), Traditional DES Speed.#1.........: 1752.8 MH/s (95.32ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:64 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 1729.3 MH/s (96.65ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:64 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 1749.5 MH/s (95.53ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:64 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 1740.6 MH/s (96.01ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:64 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 6972.3 MH/s Hashmode: 500 - md5crypt, MD5 (Unix), Cisco-IOS $1$ (MD5) (Iterations: 1000) Speed.#1.........: 24882.8 kH/s (50.59ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:1000 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 24828.0 kH/s (50.60ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:1000 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 24865.7 kH/s (50.60ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:1000 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 24849.6 kH/s (50.59ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:1000 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 99426.0 kH/s Hashmode: 3200 - bcrypt $2*$, Blowfish (Unix) (Iterations: 32) Speed.#1.........: 69071 H/s (54.00ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:16 Thr:24 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 68818 H/s (54.25ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:16 Thr:24 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 68926 H/s (54.13ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:16 Thr:24 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 69013 H/s (54.04ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:16 Thr:24 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 275.8 kH/s Hashmode: 1800 - sha512crypt $6$, SHA512 (Unix) (Iterations: 5000) Speed.#1.........: 386.4 kH/s (84.04ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 377.9 kH/s (85.68ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 372.3 kH/s (86.76ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 382.7 kH/s (84.51ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 1519.3 kH/s Hashmode: 7500 - Kerberos 5, etype 23, AS-REQ Pre-Auth Speed.#1.........: 1177.0 MH/s (71.08ms) @ Accel:256 Loops:128 Thr:32 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 1175.4 MH/s (71.17ms) @ Accel:256 Loops:128 Thr:32 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 1171.5 MH/s (71.28ms) @ Accel:256 Loops:128 Thr:32 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 1177.4 MH/s (71.05ms) @ Accel:256 Loops:128 Thr:32 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 4701.3 MH/s Hashmode: 13100 - Kerberos 5, etype 23, TGS-REP Speed.#1.........: 1068.5 MH/s (78.29ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:32 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 1069.4 MH/s (78.25ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:32 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 1068.4 MH/s (78.32ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:32 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 1068.6 MH/s (78.29ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1024 Thr:32 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 4275.0 MH/s Hashmode: 15300 - DPAPI masterkey file v1 (Iterations: 23999) Speed.#1.........: 148.5 kH/s (93.95ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:512 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 148.4 kH/s (93.99ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:512 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 148.5 kH/s (93.96ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:512 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 148.4 kH/s (93.95ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:512 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 593.8 kH/s Hashmode: 15900 - DPAPI masterkey file v2 (Iterations: 12899) Speed.#1.........: 80610 H/s (80.47ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 80606 H/s (80.47ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 80596 H/s (80.48ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 80378 H/s (80.46ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:256 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 322.2 kH/s Hashmode: 7100 - macOS v10.8+ (PBKDF2-SHA512) (Iterations: 1023) Speed.#1.........: 1002.4 kH/s (78.60ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:31 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 1002.4 kH/s (78.60ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:31 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 1002.1 kH/s (78.62ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:31 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 1002.7 kH/s (78.58ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:31 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 4009.6 kH/s Hashmode: 11600 - 7-Zip (Iterations: 16384) Speed.#1.........: 897.6 kH/s (82.05ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:4096 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 896.4 kH/s (82.09ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:4096 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 893.3 kH/s (83.60ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:4096 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 912.4 kH/s (81.95ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:4096 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 3599.7 kH/s Hashmode: 12500 - RAR3-hp (Iterations: 262144) Speed.#1.........: 116.6 kH/s (60.91ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:16384 Thr:128 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 111.4 kH/s (63.61ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:16384 Thr:128 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 111.6 kH/s (63.63ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:16384 Thr:128 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 115.0 kH/s (61.81ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:16384 Thr:128 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 454.7 kH/s Hashmode: 13000 - RAR5 (Iterations: 32799) Speed.#1.........: 93248 H/s (54.69ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:128 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 93202 H/s (54.72ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:128 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 93009 H/s (54.70ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:128 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 93241 H/s (54.69ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:128 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 372.7 kH/s Hashmode: 6211 - TrueCrypt RIPEMD160 + XTS 512 bit (Iterations: 1999) Speed.#1.........: 672.2 kH/s (55.34ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:64 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 672.1 kH/s (55.34ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:64 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 671.4 kH/s (55.34ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:64 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 672.2 kH/s (55.34ms) @ Accel:16 Loops:64 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 2687.9 kH/s Hashmode: 13400 - KeePass 1 (AES/Twofish) and KeePass 2 (AES) (Iterations: 24569) Speed.#1.........: 111.2 kH/s (122.52ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:128 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 111.1 kH/s (122.55ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:128 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 111.2 kH/s (122.58ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:128 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 111.2 kH/s (122.52ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:128 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 444.7 kH/s Hashmode: 6800 - LastPass + LastPass sniffed (Iterations: 499) Speed.#1.........: 5944.3 kH/s (35.66ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:249 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 5942.0 kH/s (35.66ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:249 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 5939.0 kH/s (35.67ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:249 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 5943.8 kH/s (35.66ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:249 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 23769.0 kH/s Hashmode: 11300 - Bitcoin/Litecoin wallet.dat (Iterations: 200459) Speed.#1.........: 11370 H/s (73.48ms) @ Accel:2 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#2.........: 11355 H/s (73.50ms) @ Accel:2 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#3.........: 11369 H/s (73.49ms) @ Accel:2 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#4.........: 11370 H/s (73.49ms) @ Accel:2 Loops:1024 Thr:1024 Vec:1 Speed.#*.........: 45464 H/s For a real world example, I had ~1,500 NTLM hashes to crack that I ran through some of the hatecrack methodology, and here's how the instance performed: 100 LM hashes discovered, all cracked in 7 minutes (heh, 7 minutes :-) Ran hatecrack's quick crackw ith no rules: done in 7 minutes, cracked 108 accounts Quick crack against one rule to rule them all: ran in 25 minutes, got got 271 new passwords Ran extensive hatecrack methodology, it ran for a little over 2 hours and got 88 new passwords. All said and done, about 1/3 of the passwords cracked in about 3 hours. Not bad! Don't forget, the second you're done with your cracking efforts, SHUT THE BOX DOWN! Otherwise you're in for a sour surprise come AWS billing day :-( On a few personal notes: Last Comic Standing was the show I couldn't think of during the episode :-) After a toxic non-toxic foam pit incident a few years ago, my family and I had another injury this weekend with a rented waterslide - the fun ended in a concussion!
Hey everybody! Today Joe and I sat down with Nikhil Mittal of Pentester Academy and Altered Security to talk about a whole slew of fun security topics: How Nikhil first got involved in Pentester Academy Nikhil's hacker origin story How does Nikhil feel about his tools being used by baddies? What security tools/defenses would be good for SMBs to focus on? Active Directory security - is all hope lost? Will AI, ML, Terminator robots, etc. replace all of us who do pentesting for a living?