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The Answer Is Transaction Costs · Tuesday · 26 min

The Senate Is The Enemy And Other Friction Stories

Send us Fan Mail We argue that “friction” is not always a flaw and can be a deliberate shield against bad collective decisions. We use Buchanan and Tullock’s public choice framework to show why supermajorities, veto points, and other transaction costs can protect rights while still leaving room for day to day governing. • contrasting cheap outrage with intentional institutional friction • explaining why constitutional amendment rules use supermajorities • breaking down external costs versus decision-making costs • applying the framework to routine policy versus foundational rules • linking cancel culture to collapsed coordination costs and lost buffers • spotting designed friction in bicameralism, vetoes, jury unanimity, central bank independence, corporate charters, and treaties • testing objections about minority rule, the filibuster, and who classifies “big” decisions • discussing ballot initiatives, referenda, and easy-to-amend constitutions • sharing listener letters, egg market notes, and a book recommendation Links: Shruti Rajagopalan on TAITC The Senate is the Enemy... (claims it comes from "The West Wing," but this is a story that I heard in the 1980s. West Wing just used it. Strange that people think a TV show is a SOURCE. It was just the MEDIUM, people!) Book-o-da-week: Benjamin Labatut, THE MANIAC If you have questions or comments, or want to suggest a future topic, email the show at taitc.email@gmail.com ! You can follow Mike Munger on Twitter at @mungowitz

0:00 · Outrage And The Case For Friction-26:11

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Send us Fan Mail

We argue that “friction” is not always a flaw and can be a deliberate shield against bad collective decisions. We use Buchanan and Tullock’s public choice framework to show why supermajorities, veto points, and other transaction costs can protect rights while still leaving room for day to day governing. 
• contrasting cheap outrage with intentional institutional friction 
• explaining why constitutional amendment rules use supermajorities 
• breaking down external costs versus decision-making costs 
• applying the framework to routine policy versus foundational rules 
• linking cancel culture to collapsed coordination costs and lost buffers 
• spotting designed friction in bicameralism, vetoes, jury unanimity, central bank independence, corporate charters, and treaties 
• testing objections about minority rule, the filibuster, and who classifies “big” decisions 
• discussing ballot initiatives, referenda, and easy-to-amend constitutions 
• sharing listener letters, egg market notes, and a book recommendation 

Links:

If you have questions or comments, or want to suggest a future topic, email the show at taitc.email@gmail.com !


You can follow Mike Munger on Twitter at @mungowitz 


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