
transcript
show notes
This week we talk about the collapse of a Paraguayan bank, the removal of a president, and a struggle inside one of the world’s longest-serving ruling parties.
We also discuss deposit insurance, public pension money, and the difference between political accountability and criminal guilt.
Recommended Book: Three Parts Dead by Max Gladstone
Transcript
In Paraguay, a country of around six million people, the accounts of a bank with close to three million customers were suddenly frozen on November third. People couldn’t withdraw their savings, transfer money, or use their cards. And while the government began returning some of these frozen deposits within days, a great many people were left wondering when, and whether, they would get all their money back.
Three days later, the country’s president, Santiago Peña, was out of office.
Peña had been elected in 2023. He offered to resign as the bank crisis grew, but lawmakers rejected that resignation and removed him through an impeachment vote instead. His vice president, Pedro Alliana, is now president, while Peña faces criminal charges connected to the bank’s collapse. He denies wrongdoing, and those charges have not been proven in court.
What I’d like to talk about today is how a bank failure became a presidential crisis, and why the removal of one leader may not change the underlying political system that allowed this situation to develop in Paraguay.
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The bank was called Ueno, spelled U-E-N-O, and it enjoyed a remarkably rapid rise in Paraguay. It began operating under that name in 2021, won a banking license in 2023, and absorbed an established bank called Visión the following year. It offered an easy-to-use digital account, generous rebates on everyday purchases, and a familiar name: it sponsored Paraguay’s national soccer team and slathered its branding across the country.
Its growth wasn’t just the consequence of aggressive advertising, though. Ueno reached people traditional banks had often missed. According to the bank, more than a million Paraguayans opened their first bank account with them. And again, in 2026 it reported roughly three million customers, making its failure a problem for a substantial share of the country’s adults, and something like half of the country’s total population.
And it wasn’t just normal people: public institutions were putting money in there, too. By the time Ueno failed, it held around $850 million in public deposits, roughly 30% of the money deposited with the bank. That included money from the country’s social security institution, pension funds, and operators of its large hydroelectric dams. So this wasn’t only a question of individual savings accounts. Money intended for retirement and public services was involved, as well.
Let’s talk about banking in general, real quick, to better understand what happened here, and how a bank this successful could suffer an outcome this bad.
When you deposit money, that deposit becomes an obligation the bank owes you. The bank uses much of the money it receives to make loans and buy other assets. If those assets are sound, the bank can generally meet its obligations over time. But if a significant number of loans are unlikely to be repaid, the bank may owe depositors more than its assets can cover. The bank’s own capital is supposed to absorb some of those losses; regulators require banks hold a minimum amount of money for precisely that reason.
In Ueno’s case, Paraguay’s central bank said a review found problems with the quality of its assets, inadequate documentation for some transactions, and lending to companies connected to the bank’s owners. After the necessary adjustments to its accounts, Ueno’s measure of financial strength fell below half the required minimum. On November third, the central bank began a formal process to resolve the bank: taking control to assess what it owned, protect what it could, and determine how customers would be paid.
Loans to a bank’s owners or their other companies are especially sensitive because the bank may have reasons to make those loans on terms it wouldn’t offer an unrelated borrower. That doesn’t mean every such loan is fraudulent, or that investigators have established exactly how much will be lost here. But it does help explain why the regulator’s findings were more serious than a temporary shortage of cash.
And those findings raised another question: how had this bank grown so much, and received so much public money, if it had these sorts of problems?
Peña had owned a stake in Ueno’s parent company until 2025. After becoming president, he also appointed Carlos Carvallo, who had previously led Ueno’s predecessor company, to head the central bank that regulated it. Lawmakers have accused Peña of using his position to direct public funds toward Ueno, and of allowing a large concentration of social security money in the bank despite legal limits. Prosecutors are investigating Peña and Carvallo over alleged misconduct connected with those decisions, though currently, as of the day I’m recording this, both men deny wrongdoing.
There are several distinct questions swirling around this situation right now, including whether Peña broke the law, and whether particular regulatory decisions were improper. A conflict of interest can also be politically damaging even before anyone proves a crime, especially when people cannot access their savings; and that’s where we’re at right now. The justice system hasn’t proven anything quite yet, but it does look like Peña and his people might have done something bad here, and that’s already leading to some potentially serious consequences for him and his party.
Peña belonged to the Colorado Party, which has governed Paraguay for all but a few years since the late 1940s. Its long period in power includes the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner, which ended in 1989, and decades of competitive elections since then. The most notable break came when opposition candidate Fernando Lugo won the presidency in 2008; Congress removed him by impeachment in 2012, and the Colorados returned to the presidency the following year. The party controls both chambers of Congress today, and that means the president’s survival depends not just on support from voters, but on support within a party that has many factions, patrons, and institutions of its own.
One of the most powerful people in that party right now is Horacio Cartes, a wealthy businessman who was president from 2013 to 2018 and now leads the Colorados. He helped launch Peña’s national career, making him finance minister and supporting his presidential ambitions. But reporting from Paraguayan and international outlets describes a growing rift between the two men as Peña built a political base of his own. In September, senators aligned with Cartes began pressing the central bank for information about Ueno.
And Cartes has his own controversial history. In 2023, the US Treasury imposed financial sanctions on him, accusing him of corruption and bribing lawmakers. He denied the allegations. The United States lifted those sanctions in 2025, saying they were no longer serving its foreign-policy goals; though notably, they never even implied the original allegations were false. Cartes, for his part, remained an influential party leader throughout.
This matters because it helps explain how Peña could lose office so quickly. As the bank crisis spread and crowds demanded answers, his own party turned against him. Peña offered to resign, but Congress chose to impeach him; all 44 senators present voted to remove him. The lower house also considered impeaching Vice President Alliana, who faced allegations related to the bank, but rejected that effort. Alliana then took over the presidency and is due to serve the remainder of the term, through August 2028.
The practical consequences of all this are still unfolding. Paraguay has a deposit guarantee, funded for the banking system, that covers each eligible depositor up to 75 monthly minimum wages, curre…
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