Railway Cybersecurity: Why Attack Detection Does Not Prove Safety

Detecting a railway cyberattack does not establish that the physical system remains safe. Explore IAM4RAIL and the evidence needed to connect detection, operational response and safety assurance. The central question is what an operator can justify after the alert, rather than whether an alert exists. https://cybersecurityunderpressure.com/episodes Related CUP episodes: Frauscher FDS102: Why Railway Diagnostics Belong Inside the Security Boundary Authenticated but Wrong: When Railway APIs Contradict Physical Reality Why Rail Operators Fear the Patch When a Patch Reopens the Safety Case Rail Service Risk Starts Outside the SIL Boundary Railway OT Segmentation: Protecting the Certified Core Why FRMCS Cannot Trust the Mobile Carrier The Red Signal. Paralyzing a Railway Network with a Single Patch Legacy rail assets do not become secure by policy The Friday Night Patch & The Illusion of Segmentation